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Abstract 
Denmark, Germany and Sweden are along with 24 other countries members of the European 
Union. Being part of the European Union also means being part of a European market. Within 
the union barriers for trade has been abolished in order to create more open market. This open 
market has also contributed towards a more globalized market for dairy products. What used 
to be a domestic market has become globalised with increasing trade among the members. 
The membership also includes a common agricultural policy (CAP) which regulates rules for 
animal welfare, the environment and subsidies. The common agricultural policy provides a 
framework for laws and legislation within the European Union. The idea of these common 
policies is to provide similar conditions for the market players irrespective of member 
country.  
 
However, each member state applies the policies a bit differently but still within the 
framework which affect the conditions for the producers differently. In addition to the 
European framework each county has its own individual system of laws, taxation and 
reimbursements which affect the competitiveness. Subsidies and tax reductions given to dairy 
farmers can be viewed as cost reducers rather than ensuring a minimum income. The 
subsidies enable the farmers to maintain production even if the market price is lower than the 
variable costs. The effect from the subsidies then make the marginal cost lower which gives 
the farmers a competitive advantage in form of cost advantage. 
 
The aim of this study is to investigate how subsidies and tax systems affects the 
competitiveness for dairy producers in Denmark, Germany and Sweden. To illustrate the 
effects of the different systems a case farm located in southwest Sweden has been used. The 
farm has 220 dairy cows and 205 hectares of agricultural land. The theory used to measure the 
effects from the three different systems has its basis from a dissertation by Ola Flaten (2001).  
 
The results show that there are differences in the result for the case farm when the different 
rules are applied. The most profitable system when applied to the case farm is the German 
which generates a net farm income of 277 940 Euros. The second most profitable system 
when applied to the case farm is the Danish which generates a net farm income of 272 870 
Euros. The Swedish system generates the lowest net farm income of 271 542 Euros.  
 
In order to measure competitiveness the average cost per delivered ton milk has been used. 
The most competitive system when applied to the case farm is the Danish which has an 
average cost per delivered ton milk of 248,6 Euros. The second lowest average cost has the 
Swedish system which is 251,3 Euros per delivered ton milk. The highest average cost is 
generated by the German system which amounts to 256,3 Euros per delivered ton milk.  
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Sammanfattning 
Danmark, Tyskland och Sverige är tillsammans med 24 andra länder medlemmar i den 
Europeiska Unionen. Medlemskapet i den Europeiska Unionen innebär också att man är del 
av den Europeiska marknaden. Inom unionen har handelshinder som tullar avskaffats för att 
skapa och gynna en mer öppen marknad. Denna öppna marknad inom EU har också medfört 
en mer öppen och globaliserad marknad inom mjölkproduktionen. Det som tidigare till stor 
del endast bestod av inhemska marknader har blivit mer globaliserade och istället lett till en 
stor gemensam marknad mellan medlemsländerna. Medlemskapet i EU innebär även en 
gemensam jordbrukspolitik för alla medlemsländer med regelverk för djurvälfärd, miljö och 
olika former av stöd och ersättningssystem. Den gemensamma jordbrukspolitiken ger ett 
ramverk för hur olika lagar och regler inom jordbrukspolitiken ska utformas. Tanken med 
detta gemensamma ramverk är att ge liknande förutsättningar för alla aktörer på marknaden. 
 
Dock kan tillämpningen av reglerna skilja sig något länderna emellan men det sker ändå inom 
ramverket. Detta medför att förutsättningarna för producenterna kan skilja sig något mellan 
länderna. Utöver den gemensamma jordbrukspolitiken har varje land en nationell politik som 
styr lagar, skatter och ersättningar till lantbruket. Alla dessa varierande förutsättningar mellan 
länderna påverkar och skapar skillnader mellan ländernas konkurrenskraft. Stöd och andra 
ersättningar i form av skattereduktioner kan betraktas som kostnadsreducering och inte som 
ett stöd för att garantera en lägsta inkomst. Dessa stöd och ersättningar gör det möjligt för 
lantbrukaren att bibehålla produktion trots att marknadspriset är lägre än den rörliga 
kostnaden. Effekten från stöden och ersättningarna leder då till lägre en lägre marginalkostnad 
vilket medför en konkurrensfördel i form av kostnadsfördelar.  
 
Denna studie syftar till att utröna hur bidrag och skattesystem kan påverka konkurrensen inom 
mjölkproduktionen för lantbrukare i Danmark, Tyskland och Sverige. För att illustrera vilka 
effekter de olika systemen kan medföra har en fallgård använts. Fallgården ligger vid 
Falkenberg i södra Sverige och har en produktion som omfattar 220 mjölkkor och 205 hektar 
jordbruksmark. Teorin som använts för att mäta effekterna mellan de tre olika systemen är 
baserade på en doktorsavhandling som gjorts av Ola Flaten (2001). 
 
Resultatet från studien visar att vissa skillnader uppstår när de olika systemen appliceras på 
gården. Det tyska systemet tillämpat på fallgården ger den högsta lönsamheten. Med det tyska 
systemet generar gården en nettointäkt på 277 940 Euro. Det näst mest lönsamma systemet är 
det danska som genererar en nettointäkt på 272 870 Euro. Det svenska systemet är det minst 
lönsamma och genererar en något lägre nettointäkt på 271 542 Euro.  
 
För att mäta konkurrenskraft har genomsnittskostnaden per levererat ton mjölk analyserats. 
Det mest konkurrenskraftiga systemet för fallgården är det danska som ger en 
genomsnittskostnad på 248,6 Euro per levererat ton mjölk. Den näst mest konkurrenskraftiga 
systemet är det svenska som ger en genomsnittlig produktionskostnad på 251,3 Euro per 
levererat ton mjölk. Det minst konkurrenskraftiga systemet är det tyska som ger en 
genomsnittskostnad på 256,3 Euro per levererat ton mjölk.  
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Problem background 
In 1951 representatives of the states: Belgium, France, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands and 
Germany signed a treaty called the Coal and steel community to unite Western Europe after 
the Second World War (Bernitz et al. 1998, p.23) (www, Europa, Gateway to the European 
Union 2011). This was the first step in creating the European Union. The collaboration was 
extended in 1957 with the Rome treaty which included enhanced economic cooperation 
(Bernitz et al. 1998, p.26). The intention of the treaty was to create a common market which 
facilitates trade and improve mobility between the group of countries. As Article 2 of the 
original treatment specifies: 
 
 “ The community shall have its task, by establishing a common market and progressively 
approximating economic policies of Member States, to promote throughout the Community a 
harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an 
increase in stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations 
between the States belonging to it” (Article 2, Rome treaty, 1957) 
 
The community which was established was called the EEC, European Economic Community.  
 
To gain control of the important food market EEC launched a common agricultural policy 
(CAP) beginning in 1961 (Dewatripont et al. 1999, p.85). The aim of the policy was to 
provide all farmers the same price for the same products. The aim was to secure food 
production but soon the pricing system caused overproduction. 
 
In the 1960s the trade between the member states, but also among other countries in the world 
increased (Dewatripont et al. 1999, p.36). Tariffs between the member states were abolished 
for commodities which were traded between the countries. The member states also decided to 
use identical import duties towards non-member states.  
 
Germany which is one of the three countries taking part in that study has applied the CAP 
since the start. In 1973 EEC was extended with the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark 
(Bernitz et al. 1998, p.29). After this expansion the collaboration was reinforced and measures 
to fight environmental problems were established. In 1974 a fund was introduced to 
strengthen rural development by redistributing money from richer regions to poor regions 
within the EEC (www, Europa, Gateway to the European Union 2011). During the following 
years the collaboration was extended and more countries decided to join.  
 
In 1995 Sweden entered the European Union (EU) (www, Europa, Gateway to the European 
Union 2011). From that on the Swedish duties and other barriers for trade with other EU 
members were abolished (Jordbruksverket 2007). As a member of the EU, each member state 
is covered by the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). In the dairy sector this means import 
duties to protect borders, milk quota system, export subsidies, public storage of butter and 
skim milk powder, private storage of butter, subsidies for the use of skim milk powder and 
milk powder as feed, subsidies for use of skim milk powder in production of casein and 
caseinates, and finally subsidies for milk in schools and trading standards (www, 
Jordbruksverket 1 2010). These changes in the policy towards milk producers have affected 
the Swedish dairy sector of today. 
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The introduction of milk quotas caused problems and insecurity in the sector which could be 
viewed as one of many explanations for the lower production that followed. The Swedish 
milk production have not fulfilled the quota and in 2007 the Swedish milk producers used 
only 93,9 per cent of the quota (Jordbruksverket 2007, p.130).  
 
A more open market since the entry into EU has led to an increase in the export of Swedish 
dairy products (Jordbruksverket 2007, p.135). However, since the entry into EU the total 
production of milk in Sweden has decreased by 11 per cent from 3,28 million tons in year 
1997 (Jordbruksverket 2007, p.130) to 2,93 million tons in 2009 (www, Jordbruksverket 1 
2010). The more open market has also contributed towards an increase in import of dairy 
products. The main exporters of dairy products to Sweden are Denmark, Netherlands, 
Germany and Finland.  
 
1.2 Danish dairy industry 
Milk production has during the last ten years been subject to a substantial structural 
development. The number of dairy farms has decreased by more than 50 per cent and the 
number of cows has decreased by almost 20 per cent (Nygaard 2007). However, the 
production has not decreased but instead increased with 2 per cent. The farms have during this 
period become larger and the number of cows per dairy herd has almost doubled to 127 cows 
per herd which is the highest number in Europe, see  
Table 1 (www, Danish Agriculture & Food Council 2011). The yield from the cows has since 
1996 increased from 7 100 kilos to 8 800 kilos per year, see Figure 1(Hemme et al. 2010, 
p.93).  
 
The Danish dairy production consisted in 2008 of about 4500 producers (www, 
Danishdairyboard 2011). In 2009 the total production of milk amounted to 4,74 million tons 
making Denmark the 9
th
 largest producer in EU-27, see Figure 2 (Martins et al. 2010). The 
production in Denmark by far exceeds the consumption of milk and almost 2/3 of the milk is 
processed into products that are exported. This high export share makes Denmark one of the 
top five exporting countries in the world. The value of the exported dairy products was 1,75 
billion Euros in 2006 (Winther-Rasmussen 2007). Although Denmark exports a majority of 
its dairy production about 25 per cent of the cheese and 20 per cent of the yoghurt 
consumption is imported annually (www, Danishdairyboard 2011).  
 
Within the milk processing industry there are several actors but the dominating actor is the 
cooperative Arla Foods. Arla Foods is co-owned with Swedish dairy producers and processes 
more than 90 per cent of the Danish milk annually (Hemme et al. 2010, p.93). 
 
1.3 German dairy industry  
In the same way as in the two other countries analyzed in this study the agricultural sector has 
undergone a substantial structural development in Germany (Gurrath 2009, p.5). The number 
of dairy farms in 2010 was about 93500, of which 5260 farms were based in the region of 
Schleswig-Holstein (Wohlfarth & Pötzsch 2010, p.18) 
.  
Germany is one of the countries that contribute most to the total number of livestock in the 
EU with 13,5 per cent (Hemme et al. 2010, p.102). Germany dairy production accounts for 
21,2 per cent of the total amount of milk collected in EU-27 2009 (Martins et al. 2010, p.102). 
This makes Germany the most important milk producer in the EU with an total production of 
28,25 million tons, 2009.  
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The number of dairy cows has during the latest ten years decreased from about 4 500 000 in 
year 2000 to 4 200 000 in 2009 which corresponds to an reduction of 6,7 % (Wohlfarth & 
Pötzsch 2010, p.18). However if we go further back in time the number of cows has decreased 
with 22,3 per cent since 1992. The average herd size in Germany was 33,7 cows in the year of 
2000 and in 2010 it had increased to 44,7 cows (Wohlfarth & Pötzsch 2010, p.19). If we 
examine Schleswig-Holstein during the same time period we note a change from 38,7 cows 
up to 68,6 cows.  
 
German dairy production has gone through a structural change where dairy production tends 
to move to the northwest parts of the country (Thiele & Hargens 2008). Between 1991- 2005 
has the dairy production in Schleswig-Holstein increased with 7,1 % and in Niedersachsen 
increased with 3,8 %. Northwest Germany, especially Schleswig-Holstein and Niedersachsen 
are regions where dairy production has a competitive advantage due to large areas of 
permanent pasture and less beneficial conditions for growing grain.  
 
 A comparison comparing farms among the German “Bundesländer” reveals a very different 
structure among them. Bavaria is the by far largest dairy producer in Germany with a 
production of 7 535 million tons in 2009 followed by Niedersachsen which produced 5 591 
million tons (Wohlfarth & Pötzsch 2010, p.17). Schleswig-Holstein is the fourth largest, 
producing 2 589 million tons in 2009. The average cow herd also differs a lot within the 
country especially when former East and West Germany is compared. The average farm in 
former East is four times larger than the ones in former West (Wohlfarth & Pötzsch 2010, 
p.19). Differences can also be found when comparing northern and southern parts of the 
country where Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria have smaller farms then regions in the north. 
About half of the milk produced in Germany is exported to other countries (Hemme et al. 
2010, p.102). The export market is very important for the economy of the German dairy 
industry (www, meine-milch 1, 2011). 45 per cent of the milk produced is used for cheese 
production. A large part of the production is exported. Germany is the biggest exporter of 
cheese within the EU but also the biggest producer. From year 1997 till 2007 the export of 
cheese increased with 70 per cent. 
 
Germany has a lot of milk processors that are relatively large, in 2009 Nordmilch Konzern 
was the biggest one processing 4,1 million tons (Hemme et al. 2010, p.102). The ten biggest 
processors account for 58 per cent of the total milk delivered.  
 
1.4 Swedish dairy industry  
Swedish dairy production has during the last ten years experienced a downward spiral with 
decreasing production. Since the year 2000 the dairy production has decreased with more than 
10 per cent (www, Jordbruksverket 1 2010) and the number of dairy cows has decreased with 
more than 15 per cent (www, Jordbruksverket 2, 2011). During this period there has been an 
increase in the yield from the cows and in 2009 the average cow produced 9486 kilogram 
ECM (Energy corrected milk) (www, Swedish Dairy Association 2011). The average herd 
size has during this period also increased and was in 2009 about 60 cows per herd.  
 
During the last 15 years the number of dairy farmers has decreased substantially. In 1995 
there were 17 700 dairy farmers and in 2010 the number has decreased to 5600 which 
corresponds to a decrease of 68 per cent (Jordbruksverket 2011a, p.6). Sweden were in 2009 
the 11
th
 largest producer within EU-27 with a production of 2,95 million tons (Martins et al. 
2010, p.107). The Swedish dairy production is self-sufficient (Hemme et al. 2010, p.150). The 
import of goods from EU to Sweden has increased substantially. Since the year of 2000 the 
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imports have increased from 55 000 tons to 306 000 tons in 2009 to a value of 6 billion SEK 
(Statistics Sweden 2010, p.276). Export have during the same period increased from 56 000 
tons to 95 000 tons to a value of 3 billion SEK.  
 
Within the dairy processing industry, as in Denmark, Arla Foods is the dominating actor with 
a market share of more than 70 per cent. Other larger actors on the market are Skånemejerier, 
Milko, Norrmejerier and Falköpings Mejeri. These actors together process more than 90 per 
cent of the delivered milk (Hemme et al. 2010, p.150) 
 
Table 1 Structural data describing dairy production in Denmark, Germany (Schleswig-Holstein) and Sweden 
Measures DK DE (S-H) SE 
Average herd size 2010  127* 44,7 (68,6)** 61,9*** 
Average milk yield, 2009, IFCN 8800 7200 9100 
No. Farms 2010 4100* 93497 (5260) ** 5600*** 
Tot. milk produced (million tonnes) 
 2009, IFCN 5,05 30,19 3,26 
Sources: *(www, Danish Agriculture & Food Council 2011)  **(Wohlfarth & Pötzsch 2010, 
pp.19, 20)(Jordbruksverket 2011a, p.6) (Jordbruksverket 2011a, p.6)  ***(Jordbruksverket 
2011a, pp.6, 7) (Hemme et al. 2010, pp.93, 102, 150)  
 
 
Figure 1, Milk yield over time in Denmark, Germany and Sweden 
Source: (Hemme et al. 2010, pp.93, 102, 150)  
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Figure 2, Milk production over time in Denmark, Germany and Sweden 
Source: (Hemme et al.  2010, pp.93, 102, 105)  
 
1.5 Problem  
The dairy market in Sweden and Europe has become a lot more volatile and market oriented 
during the last years (Pers. com, Rietz 2011). This is a result of a more globalised market 
where the entire EU is becoming one market instead of separate markets in each individual 
country. Today all the members of EU adjust to CAP which regulates the production of 
agricultural products (Dewatripont et al. 1999, pp.85-90). CAP also defines a framework for 
laws and legislation within the agricultural sector. The regulations within CAP cover areas 
such as environment, budgets, subsidies, animal welfare and in some areas quantity produced. 
At a first glance the rules that affect the producers in each country appear to be very similar. 
However, countries apply the rules and regulations stated by CAP rather differently but still 
within the framework (Pers. com, Rietz 2011). Differences in appliance of the rules result in 
differences in terms of competitiveness among the producers. There are also national rules, 
legislations and taxation systems determined by each country in addition to the rules 
formulated by CAP (Jordbruksverket 1 2010). These differences can be noticed in many 
areas. As an example the Danish producers have a tax on their agricultural land 
(Jordbruksverket 1 2010, p.8). The German farmers face an heavily subsidized production of 
farm-sized digesters (Pers. com, Rietz 2011) and the Finnish farmers receive almost twice the 
amount of direct subsidies compared to Sweden (Jordbruksverket 1 2010, p.7). Each country 
has different priorities and the policies are different which also affect the competitiveness 
differently.  
 
The problem can be divided into two categories, “direct monetary values” and “indirect 
monetary values”. The direct monetary values consist of taxes and subsidies which affect the 
farmers and the competitiveness directly. The indirect monetary values consist of rules 
regarding animal welfare and environment. These rules affect the farmers’ indirectly in the 
form of cost of production. Rules for animal welfare can affect the cost for constructing 
buildings and also ways to work. Taxes, duties or subsidies on production factors are along 
with rules guiding environment and animal welfare conditions important instruments to 
regulate the behavior and actions of the farmers and their operation. 
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1.6 Aim  
The aim of this study is to identify how different policies create differences in the 
competitiveness between Danish, German and Swedish dairy producers. The study focuses on 
identifying differences which affect the “direct monetary values” such as subsidy levels and 
tax systems. Creating an inventory of existing taxes and subsides which could be applied at a 
dairy farm.  
 
The measurements of competitiveness between countries are a complex matter and a 
controversial issue, (OECD 2010). There is a lack of definitions that are accepted as methods 
to compare competitiveness. Generally competitiveness at a national level could be defined as 
the ability of a country to produce goods and services that can meet competing products from 
other countries. The production must maintain and expand domestic real income and 
according to some also maintain the market share. A range of different ways of describing 
competitiveness end up in two underlying factors related to the theories of Porter (1985).  
 
1. Relative costs and price differentials  
2. Qualitative factors, ability to innovate 
The second factor makes it possible for a country to export goods even when they sell them at 
a higher price than the competitors. These two factors can be related to the concept of 
competitive advantage (Porter 1985). Porter discusses a model which divides the qualities of a 
firm, consisting of weaknesses and strengths, into two important basic types of competitive 
advantages: low cost or differentiation.  
 
Porter defines five forces that a firm has to cope with. If the firm is more successful in 
adapting to these forces than competitors it will become successful. Porters five forces are 
affecting the competitiveness of the firm is:  
 
1. potential competitors entering the market 
2. threat of substitutes 
3. bargaining power of buyers 
4. bargaining power of suppliers 
5. rivalry among existing competitors 
Source: (Porter 1985, pp.4,5) 
The concept of competitive advantage describes how a firm acts to achieve and sustain a 
competitive advantage by using a generic strategy (Porter 1985). How well the firm can gain a 
position compared to the industry average will determine the success of the firm. Porter 
defines three generic strategies, one of them is cost leadership. The fact that this study focus 
at policy differences affecting milk production puts comparative advantage in terms of cost 
leadership into focus.  
 
The member states strive to keep job opportunities and stability in their own country. 
Different ideologies and politics among member states cause different objectives and 
disagreements of how the EU legislation should be implemented in each country. Due to 
political reasons taxes on labour and social security fees may also play an important role. Also 
other fiscal factors such as inheritance or gift taxes are of ideological concern. Furthermore 
the extent to which each country support their farmers with advisory services and also the 
way they control them may cause considerable disparities. To see countries as firms 
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competing to each other is an issue that is questioned (Krugman 1994). Striving to get market 
advantage compared to other countries can lead to unfavorable economic policies.  
 
1.7 Objectives 
Even though all three countries are members of the EU, which should be an open and free 
market with similar agriculture policies, the method of implementation may affect the 
competitiveness and result in advantages and disadvantages for the farmers. In order to 
identify factors which have an effect on the competitiveness two research questions will be 
answered.  
 
What are the implications for competitiveness depending on differences in 
Danish, German and Swedish subsidy systems? 
 
What are the implications for competitiveness depending on differences in 
Danish, German and Swedish taxation systems?   
 
What effects do subsidies and taxes cause with respect to competitiveness when applying 
Danish, German or Swedish policies on a representative Swedish case farm? Will there be 
any differences which are measurable? 
 
 
1.8 Delimitations 
This study is based on a case farm located in Sweden. The structure of the farm is built up by 
Swedish data and the input prices are due to this based on Swedish market values. Input 
prices are different among the three countries but the differences between Swedish prices 
compared to Danish and German prices are not taken into consideration. The study focuses 
only on comparing a conventional farm. Aspects that not will be considered are: 
 Organic production 
 Animal welfare, due to the complexity of differences and lack of ways to make 
monetary evaluations. 
 Buildings, different norms, social and rules for working conditions that affect the costs 
 Differences related to location, climate and soil conditions that affect crop yields 
 Wage claims due to different political systems and other reasons 
 
1.9 Outline   
In Figure 3 is an illustration of the outline presented. The first chapter provides the reader 
with a background and general information regarding Danish, German and Swedish dairy 
production. The chapter also gives an introduction to the study. Chapter two describes the 
theoretical basis used in when studying the differences in policies. In chapter three is the 
method section that clarifies how the study has been conducted. Chapter four gives 
background to the empirics consisting of earlier studies. Chapter five and six displays the 
result regarding the countries taxation systems and subsidies available for the dairy industry 
presented. In chapter seven the case farm is described. The case farm is used to illustrate the 
implications of each country’s taxation- and subsidy system. After this follows the analysis 
and discussion in which the results from chapter five and six is analyzed. Chapter nine is the 
last chapter where the conclusions and final remarks are presented.  
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Figure 3, Illustration of the outline of the study 
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2 Theoretical perspective 
Classical view of a firm 
In the classical theory of a firm there are several assumptions made regarding the firm. The 
smallest firm is made up by an owner who owns all assets which are financed by borrowing 
and saving (Gravelle & Rees 1992, p.172). This is also the where the owner receives its 
income and controls and bears the risk related to the business.  
 
Due to the prior assumptions classical theory also assumes that the individual always tries to 
maximize its profit (Gravelle & Rees 1992, p.169). Additional assumption made by the theory 
is also that the owner, employees and board of directors always have access to full 
information regarding their market and when making decisions. Another assumption is also 
that the business always has access to the latest technology. However, some of these 
assumptions have been criticized as a company rarely has access to full information or always 
has access to the latest technology (ibid, p. 171).  
 
Competitiveness as mentioned by (Porter 1985) is very dependant of cost leadership. Not 
having access to the latest technology or having full information affects how a firm acts and 
also the costs. There are various ways for gaining cost leadership; it can among others be 
gained through economies of scale, profit maximization, better access to raw material or 
improved technology. A producer able to produce at the lowest possible price but receives a 
similar price for the products will receive higher returns and therefore has a competitive 
advantage (ibid, p.13).  
 
Production function 
A way of illustrating a company’s production is by using a production function. A production 
function describes the relationship when resources or inputs are combined into commodities, 
or outputs (Debertin 1986, p.15). The functions show how to combine inputs in order to 
maximize the output. The general way of defining a production function is. 
 
             (1) 
 
In this function   represents the output and   the input when something is produced. The 
function is identifiable for all values of   equal or greater than zero where each values 
provides a solution for    The equation (1) is very simple and assumes that the produced 
commodity only requires one input (Debertin 1986, p.20). Very few products can be produced 
in this way. Most products require several inputs. Function (2) is an example of a production 
that requires both flexible and fixed inputs. 
 
                  (2) 
 
In function (2) above    represent a variable input, for instance silage and    represents fixed 
variables, for instance labour or machinery. How to determine wither an input should be 
considered variable or fixed can sometimes be difficult. A variable input is normally 
considered as an input where the manager can alter and control the use (Debertin 1986, p.20). 
A fixed input is normally defined as an input where the manager has no control over the 
available amount. Both these perspectives on inputs change depending on time. Over a long 
enough time period almost all inputs become variable. However, over a shorter period the 
possibility for controlling the input decreases and the inputs become fixed.  
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A fundamental assumption within production economics is the law of diminishing returns. 
The law of diminishing or as Debertin (1986, p20) labels it, the law of diminishing marginal 
returns, states that after a point when one additional variable input is added and all other 
inputs remain constant, each incremental unit added to the production process produce less 
and less output. The change in production can be calculated by differentiating the production 
function to gain the first derivative. The first derivative or marginal physical product (MPP) 
expresses how much of additional input of the variable inputs    is needed to produce one unit 
of additional output (ibid, p.24).  
 
In order for a firm to maximize its profit it has to minimize the cost or the difference between 
outputs and inputs (Gravelle & Rees 1992, p.231). The company has to find the level of 
output that maximizes the revenues given the cost structure. A general way of expressing the 
profit maximization is; 
 
max ∏ =                                     (3) 
 
                   
 
where ∏ is profit,    is the price that the producer receives for its product  ,    is the cost for 
the variable input   . Profits are maximized subject to the conditions on   and it emphasizes 
the company’s output decisions. The expression of the function      is an expression for the 
total revenues generated by the company,       is an expression for the total variable costs 
related to the production of   and FC are the fixed costs related to production. When a 
theoretical model for a profit maximization problem is developed three assumptions are made; 
1
st
, the problem is a continues and differentiable production function, 2
nd
, inputs and outputs 
are devisable, 3
rd
, inputs and outputs are homogenous of degree 1 (Flaten 2001, p.48).  
 
Another way of expressing the maximization of the profit is to focus on receiving the 
maximum output from the inputs used in the production. In order to maximize the inputs 
            .  The maximization problem can now be formalized as; 
 
max ∏ =                  (4) 
 
with the same parameters as in (3). In order to maintain a profitable production in the long 
term the revenues have to be larger than the costs,                 or: 
 
    
       
    
 (5) 
 
The expression in (5) shows that the received price for product    is larger than the average 
production cost per unit (Flaten 2001, p.52). However, in the short term it might be profitable 
to maintain production as long as the variable costs per units are covered,     
   
    
. The 
excess generated from production can then cover some of the fixed costs and therefore 
decreases the loss that would be associated with having no production at all.  
 
To find where the profit is maximized equation (4) has to be partially differentiated with 
subject to    . The first-order conditions provide information concerning the optimal level of 
production but also how the profits change when one additional unit of input is added.  
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 =            = 0  (6) 
  
Equation (6) can be rewritten as  
 
  M   =    (7) 
 
From equation (6) it is clear that the optimal level of production is not affected by its fixed 
costs, FC (Flaten 2001, p.51).  
 
Production with subsidies 
Within the agricultural sector in Europe there are several subsidies, both on a national level 
and EU. The form of subsidies differ and also the intention of them. The subsidies can be 
coupled (related to a specific production) or decoupled (unrelated). The subsidies related to 
dairy production are; direct subsidies, environmental subsidies, milk quotas and production 
related subsidies. The direct subsidies are intended as an income subsidy and are decoupled 
subsidies (Bäckstrand 2003, pp.5-6). The decoupled subsidies are given to the producers to 
ensure a minimum income to farmers independent of the level of production. The farmer 
however has to respect the rules that constitute “cross compliance” (“Good agricultural and 
environmental condition” and “Statutory management requirements”) in order to receive the 
subsidy. The agri-environmental payments are also decoupled and do not have a direct effect 
on the choice of production.  
 
The milk quota was introduced in 1984 in order to restrain an increasing production of milk 
(www, HM Revenue & Customs 2011). The quota restricts production at farm level and 
determines the maximum amount of milk a producer is allowed to produce annually. A farmer 
that expands production has to acquire additional quota to avoid penalties. By introducing a 
quota the rise in production was inhibited and the price of milk remained at a similar level.  
 
The production related subsidies are a direct effect from a specific production. The coupled 
subsidies enable the farmer to produce at a lower price than the actual costs. This type of 
subsidies may also encourage less productive producers to maintain a production that 
otherwise would not be profitable.  
 
Profit maximization with subsidies 
Different subsidies have different effect on a farm’s profit function. Depending on the type of 
subsidy the profit function will be affected differently. Equation (8) is an expansion of 
equation (3) where both the coupled and decoupled subsidies have been introduced.  
 
max ∏ =                                      (8) 
 
            
 
DS in equation (7) is a decoupled subsidy which is independent of the production. ES is also 
decoupled but an environmental subsidy. H is a coupled variable subsidy and is therefore 
related to the specific enterprise. The program is solved subject to         where MQ is 
the milk quota. The production of milk therefore has to be less than or equal to the quota. The 
profit maximization problem may given the existence of a quota be formulated as a Lagrange-
function (Flaten 2001, p.56).  
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L =                                     (9) 
s.t.       
 
 
  
  
                      0     (10) 
 
Equation (10) can be rewritten as 
 
      M            (11) 
 
  
  
 =        = 0     (12) 
 
The first order conditions in equation (11) and (12) show that the decoupled subsidies DS do 
not affect the level of production. The environmental subsidies ES which also are decoupled 
subsidies do not affect the production either. Both of these subsidies however affect the total 
economic result according to equation (9). The coupled subsidy has a direct affect on the 
choice of production. The subsidy decreases the variable costs related to the production 
thereby making it more profitable. This means that a less profitable production could be 
maintained due to the subsidy.  
 
If the produced quantity of milk is less than the milk quota, MQ, the constraint is not binding. 
If the constraint is not binding the quota will have no affect on the choice of production and 
can therefore be disregarded. If however the quota is binding this will give an effect on the 
production decision.  
 
       
    
   
        (13) 
 
Equation (12) is rewritten from equation (10) and shows that when the quota is binding it can 
be viewed as a reduction of the price received which subsequent offers marginal cost   . 
When the quota is binding it is more profitable to decrease the use of variable inputs or 
production level rather than maintaining a high production (Flaten 2001, p.56).   
 
Profit maximization problem for a dairy producer 
The production in equation (9) was limited to only one cow. In equation (14) a profit function 
for a dairy farm has been formulated which is an expansion of (Flaten 2001, p.57). In addition 
to adding more cows, land, which the farmers use has been added. The land is used for 
producing silage or grain. The feed grain may be sold while the silage cannot be sold in the 
market.  
 
In equation (14) a Lagrangean-function has been formulated for a producer’s dairy operation.  
(14) 
                                                            
                      
 
s.t.                   
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   = Number of cows in production 
         = Total income from milk 
     = Decoupled subsidies 
ES   = Environmental subsidies 
         = Variable costs in dairy production 
T   = Variable subsidy due to tax reductions on inputs  
     = Capital costs per cow in production  
    = Coupled subsidies related to dairy production 
     = Kg of forage or silage per cow 
     = Kg of feed grain per cow 
     = Hours of labour per cow 
     = Unspecified variable input per cow 
     = Yield of concentrated feedstuff kg per ha  
     = Yield of forage or silage kg per ha 
     = Area of grain 
     = Area of forage or silage 
     = Variable cost per ha of grain 
     = Variable cost per ha of forage or silage 
     = Price of feed grain 
     = Shadow price of milk if the quota is binding 
     = Shadow price of land  
    = Total land 
     = Total fixed costs 
 
Based upon the program defined in (14) a Lagrange-function has been formulated for a 
producer’s dairy operation. In this equation    has been substituted with 
    
  
 according to the 
program mentioned in (14). 
    
  
 is an expression for the cost for growing silage instead of 
grain. In addition to the milk quota,    a land constraint    has been added which is the 
maximum land the farmer can access. 
      (15) 
                                                      
 
                        
    
  
                    
    
  
     
    
 
                          
 
Other outputs than milk are assumed to be constant such as breeding and slaughter of milk 
cows and calves. Coupled subsidies such as male bovine premium or other subsidies are 
assumed to reduce the production costs and therefore decrease capital costs with H (Flaten 
2001, p.57).  
 
Milk production also entitles the farmer for subsidies as reduced energy tax. This unlike the 
other subsidies, takes form of a tax reduction but still has the same effect as a coupled 
subsidy. These tax reductions, T, are included in the variable costs for the producer and have 
the same effect as a coupled subsidy.  
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As in equation (9) the production is restricted by the milk quota, MQ. If the producer does not 
have sufficient quota    will be positive and therefore become an efficient constraint that 
affects production.    can be interpreted as the shadow price or the value of producing one 
additional unit of milk that exceeds the quota (Flaten 2001, p.56).  
 
The first order necessary conditions for equation (15) are formulated as follows:  
 
(16) 
  
  
                                       
     
  
         
     
  
   
 
  
   
           
    
  
           
    
  
     (17) 
 
  
   
                               (18) 
 
  
   
                                  (19) 
 
  
   
                                   (20) 
 
  
   
                (21) 
 
  
   
                (22) 
 
  
   
   
    
  
          (23) 
 
Equation (17) and (18) can be rewritten as: 
 
       
  
  
          
  
  
                      (24) 
 
Simplifying equation (24) yields expression (25) 
 
 
      
   
   
 
     
  
         
        
   
     (25) 
 
note:           
 
Equation (25) show the cost for producing silage in the current production. 
     
  
         is 
an expression for the operational cost of silage. The operational cost for growing silage 
depends on the cost for growing and the loss of profits per hectare attributed to other land use. 
If the milk quota is restrictive the operational cost for growing silage increases. However, if 
the producer has sufficient quota and      the restriction has no effect on the operational 
cost. The alternative cost for land can in some areas be high and therefore lead to very 
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expensive feed (Flaten 2001, p.66). The subsidies for the growing of forage or silage as well 
as grain are included in the expression    and    respectively. The forage or silage subsidies 
are not subsidies directed to only dairy farming. However, in the formulated problem it is 
assumed that an external market for silage or forage does not exist and this crop is therefore 
only used if milk production exists. This makes the subsidy for grassland equivalent to a 
coupled subsidy.  
 
Equation (16) can be rewritten as: 
 
     
                      
     
  
 
     
  
    
      (26) 
 
Equation (26) displays the average cost, AC for producing one unit of milk in the short term. 
In this expression the variable costs and capital costs related to milk production are included 
(Flaten 2001, p.57). The coupled subsidies, H and the variable subsidies,   , lower the costs 
with             . These cost reductions have a positive effect on the producer’s profit 
(Bjarby 2004, p.22). The price    is only reduced if the quota is a limiting factor for the 
producer. If the producer has sufficient quota then      will therefore have no effect on the 
production.  
 
The minimum received price for the milk has to be         in order to maintain 
production. However, the productions fixed costs, FC are not included in the expression and 
to maintain production in the long term the minimum price has to be      
     
    
 (Bjarby 
2004, p.22).  
 
Equation (17), (18), (19) and (20) can be rewritten as follows: 
 
     
          
     
  
    
   
     (27) 
     
          
     
  
    
         (28) 
 
Equation (28) is an expression for the marginal cost of producing one additional unit of milk 
with variable inputs (Bjarby 2004, p.22). The expression also reveals that the coupled 
subsidies H do not affect the marginal cost. The tax reduction    however reduces the variable 
costs. This has the same effect as equation (26) where it lowers the cost and therefore 
increases the profitability.   
 
   is increasing since the marginal product for    is  decreasing. The producer will then try to 
optimize production by minimizing the costs for the variable inputs when the production is 
restricted by a quota (Bjarby 2004, p.22). Due to the price of variable inputs being known so 
does the optimal production level of   . From the equations (26) and (28) it is clear that 
     . This means that when the variable costs are minimized,    equals the average 
cost, AC is also minimized and therefore profits are maximized. When MC intersects the 
minimum point of AC is the production optimal and the profit maximized, see Figure 4.  
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Figure 4, Optimal profit with and without quota 
When the farmer has sufficient quota equation (17), (18), (19) and (20) can be reformulated as 
follows: 
 
   
          
     
  
            
   
     (29) 
 
   
          
     
  
    
         (30) 
 
The production when the quota is not binding will occur when     .  When producing 
in this situation the marginal revenue is maximized with respect to the marginal cost, see 
Figure 4. Producing in         means that the profit is maximized with respect to the 
costs.  
 
Subsidies and tax reductions given to dairy farmers can be viewed as cost reducers rather than 
ensuring a minimum income (Nalin 2000, p.20). The subsidies enable the farmers to maintain 
production even if the market price is lower than the variable costs. The effect from the 
subsidies then make the marginal cost lower which gives the farmers a competitive advantage 
in form of cost advantage.  
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3. Method 
This chapter provides a presentation of the methods used in this study. To answer the research 
questions this project has been structured as a comparison of competitiveness. Explanation of 
how data has been collected, how it has been analyzed using the chosen theories and which 
delimitations that are chosen are examples of information that is included in this chapter. 
Disadvantages and problems that may occur when generalizations and other simplifications 
are conducted will be further discussed.  
 
3.1 Approach of the study 
The study has its basis in the comparison between dairy farms in Denmark, Germany and 
Sweden. The focus of the study is to exam the different aspects that affect the competitiveness 
of the farmers. Due to the complexity of this comparison a lot of factors have to be simplified. 
Competitiveness is a complex issue and there is a lack of accepted definitions and measures in 
order to evaluate the issue. (Kaspersson et al. 2002, p.33).  
 
Competitiveness could be divided into two types (Porter 1985)(Kaspersson et al. 2002, p.33). 
The first type relates to qualitative factors such as relative price and cost variations, while the 
other second type relates to qualitative factors like innovation. Innovation can raise the 
qualities of the products and in a way that confront competitors with differentiation. 
 
The OECD is commonly using the “Producer Support Estimate” to evaluate the monetary 
value of transfers from taxpayers to agricultural producers which is further described in 
section 4.2. In this study all values of policies are converted into Euro to facilitate a 
comparison. The conversion of values from national currencies to a common comparable 
currency is an important issue (OECD 2010, p.135). This study uses ECB (European Central 
Bank) as source for exchange rates, see Appendix 1.  
 
The economic conditions are compared given the constraints defined by the policies in each 
country. The constraints consist of differences in subsidy payments and tax levels which 
affect net farm income. Rules for animal welfare and environmental issues also affect the 
production costs. Taxes and fees also affect the cost of inputs at the farm. Other national 
regulations, but also different implementation of EU-regulations, for instance the rules 
constituting cross-compliance may differ between countries. The effects of the constraints 
will be measured depending on the financial effects that the constraint cause. 
 
When the effects of economic policies are measured they are often defined as static or 
dynamic. The static definition aims to analyze the effects of the use of resources at a certain 
time. There is a risk that policies cause inefficient use of resources. This is an effect of CAP 
which is further described by the Swedish Institute for Food and Agricultural Economics 
(SLI) in their report aiming to explain why the reform of the CAP was necessary (Nalin 2000, 
p.20). The dynamic effects the report refers to is competiveness between countries constitutes 
an important factor and force for the development and economic growth. The CAP is causing 
substantial trading barriers which probably lead to negative effects concerning productivity 
and economic growth (Nalin 2000, p.20) 
 
3.1.1 Qualitative or Quantitative approach 
Qualitative science aims to clarify the feature or nature of a phenomena (Widerberg 2002, 
p.15). The purpose of the quantitative method is as opposed to the qualitative method to show 
quantities aiming to define the extent to which characteristics and traits occur. The purpose of 
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questions asked in a qualitative study is on the other hand intended to explain the meaning of 
a phenomena (Widerberg 2002). The quantitative method to a larger extent focuses on 
verifying the occurrence of a phenomena and the relationship between them. The basic aim in 
quantitative research is to measure (Lundahl & Skärvad 1999, p.94). A country comparison of 
competitiveness contains a lot of measures such as subsidy and tax levels which are defined 
by a monetary value. The use of monetary values to measure competiveness is discussed in 
OECD´s report “Producer support estimate and related indicators of agriculture support” 
(OECD 2010, p.18). There are a lot of advantages of using monetary terms, percentages or 
ratios as methods for comparison. Most of the measures in the report are related to this type of 
methods. To compare countries is as already mentioned a complex issue and comparing 
monetary values is subject to certain risks. Important issues that are mentioned is the fact that 
size and structure of the agriculture sector, but also the inflation rate in a country affect the 
result of the studies. Comparisons between countries over time cause difficulties. In order to 
reduce the impact of these difficulties this study will be conducted as a static evaluation.   
 
The aim of a qualitative study is to understand how individuals experience their surroundings 
(Kvale & Brinkman 2009). In a dialogue between two individuals leading questions should be 
avoided and the answers which are obtained should be related to the real world. The 
qualitative research method is associated with occasional risks due to the fact that the 
researcher controls the situation. This study is to a large extent based on data provided in 
other languages which increases the risk of misinterpretation. To avoid this kind of problem a 
validation is conducted containing interviews with experts in the field in Denmark, Germany 
and Sweden.   
 
The study uses a lot of precise values for subsidies and tax rates that are expressed in 
quantitative terms. For instance, it becomes possible to evaluate which of the countries that 
has the highest subsidy for grassland. A more difficult issue is what effects this causes. This is 
because other factors related to each country influence without being easily detectable.  
 
The aim of investigative work is mainly to produce knowledge (Lundahl & Skärvad 1999, 
p.9). This objective is met by drawing conclusions from data which has been collected, 
arranged and analyzed. According to (Lundahl & Skärvad 1999, p.14) the research could be 
separated into different categories depending on the purpose of it. The purpose may be to 
delineate, prepare decision making, solve conflicts, change or maintain status quo. To 
examine the effects of a decision that’s been made an investigation can be suggested (Lundahl 
& Skärvad 1999, p.24). Investigations are often conducted at different stages in a decision 
process and for different types of decisions. The aim may be attributable to past time, present 
time or future. In order to investigate public decisions by authorities at government level is it 
vital to provide a link in controlling the processes in the society (Lundahl & Skärvad 1999, 
p.23). This study aims to create a static model at which different policies can be evaluated. 
The method is further described in section 3.3-3.9.  
 
3.3 Case study approach 
The aim of this study is to investigate the static effects of different agricultural policies used in 
Denmark, Germany and Sweden. The main purpose is not so much to static examine the impact 
upon decision making but more to evaluate the consequences for cost structure and net farm 
income. In order to more accurately depict the problem a case farm is used. The case farm used in 
this study is created according to the rules and methods of IFCN, see section 3.6-3.8.  The case 
study is a useful method in scientific studies (Ejvegård 2003, p.33). The method could be more or 
less detailed. In this case the data is quite extensive and quantitative.  A case study is a workable 
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approach to investigate a small fraction of a larger phenomena. With the help from the extended 
data, this small share describes reality by considering the data as representative for reality (Ejvegård 
2003, p.33). By using this method it is possible to obtain substantial time saving in gathering data 
but also when describing the phenomena.  
 
However, there are also difficulties associated with this type of method. The part of the study object 
that is examined cannot fully represent the real world (Ejvegård 2003, p.33). Due to this fact it is of 
great importance to remember to be cautious when making conclusions. Results can only be 
regarded as indications. The value of the results could be further discussed after other tests using 
different methods have been accomplished. Three different farm plans will be evaluated by 
applying the policies of Denmark, Germany and Sweden to the case farm given by IFCN. The 
effects of specific policies will be measured as differences in profits between the farm plans of the 
three investigated countries. The profit of the farms is calculated according to equation (14) and the 
measurements of competitiveness are calculated according to equation (26).  To depict and draw 
general conclusions of the effect of the policies in each country will not be possible.  
 
Case studies have two characteristics which are common (Asbjörn Johannessen & Tufte 2003, 
p.56). The first is to ensure the delimitations of the case, what is excluded and will not be 
considered? The second step is a detailed description of the case which has been defined according 
to the delimitations. Case studies may contain both qualitative and quantitative measures. A case 
study can be performed as a case study, or as a study of more than one cases which are compared 
and related to a main case.  By using more than one case it becomes possible to examine unique 
characteristics while at the same time giving a more detailed image of similarities and differences 
(Asbjörn Johannessen & Tufte 2003, p.57). A case study is developed in close relation to the object 
of analysis (Ejvegård 2003, p.34). It is also common to use a more open-minded approach where 
understanding is viewed as the first step rather than explaining.  
 
3.4 Descriptive and Comparative approach 
Use of a descriptive method is the easiest way to explain or describe, the difficult part is the fact 
that the research process have to be conducted in a systematic rank of order (Ejvegård 2003, p.32). 
In order to submit a useful result it is necessary to scale information. The results of importance must 
be highlighted and information that is less interesting has to be deselected. The descriptive method 
is often used to answer common questions intended to give an overview of the situation. 
 
A Comparative method is commonly encountered when research is conducted in the area of 
international politics (Ejvegård 2003, p.41).  Comparative studies are often complex due to the fact 
that comparisons between societies and social phenomena are not easily done.  The phenomenon’s 
that the researcher are comparing to each other may be too different and result in a comparison 
without relevance when answering the study questions. When using this method it is really 
important to be aware of the below stated facts (Ejvegård 2003, p.41): 
 
a. The units must be comparable   
b. Before comparison can be made is it necessary to generalize the conditions 
c. To depict the differences in a meaningful way is it necessary to transfer data to the same 
units. An easy example of this is that currencies have to be converted.   
d. Both similarities and differences have to be described. 
 
These above mentioned statements can be related to this comparison of countries and as mentioned 
before, it implies a lot complexity to compare different countries (OECD 2010)(Kaspersson et al. 
2002) 
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3.5 Data collection 
This study uses a lot of statistical data. The data often consists of samples and to receive 
reliable result a description of how the selection has been conducted of great importance 
(Ejvegård 2003, p.67).  
 
The research strategy of this study makes use of a deductive research method where 
governmental rules are applied to a case farm by using equation (14) as a basis for the 
calculation. The analysis is based on the rules and legislations that affect the competitiveness 
between dairy farmers in different countries.  
 
Before initiating data collection a literature review is conducted. The literature review is 
based on earlier studies performed in the area of competitiveness and comparisons between 
different countries. The literature review provides information regarding the difficulties of 
comparing rules in different countries with each other. The reason for the difficulties when 
comparing single factors with each other is that they may give a distorted result. A farmis 
often affected by an entire system and not single factors.  
 
Subsidies and legislations regarding the agricultural sector is a topic that concerns a large 
public. Different stakeholders may try to influence the result with biased information which 
has to be disregarded due to lack of credibility. Most of the sources used are governmental 
which increase the credibility of the information.  
 
Table 2 display search terms and combinations of search terms used during both the literature 
review and the data collection process.  In search of information on the Internet the main 
search engines has been Google and Google Scholar. Other databases such as Agriwise, and 
reference databases Jstor and Econlit have been used in order to find articles regarding 
various subjects. In addition, information has been found on government homepages such as 
Ministry of Tax and Board of Agriculture for Denmark, Germany and Sweden. European 
Commission and Euro stat has also been used in the process.  
.  
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Table 2, search terms and combinations of search terms used during the data collection process. 
Competitiveness   Subsidy   Denmark 
Single Payment Scheme   Tax   Germany 
Coupled   Premium   Sweden 
Decoupled   CAP     
Property   European Union     
Dairy         
Quota         
Milk         
Investment         
Rural development And   And   
Energy         
Slaughter         
Extensification         
Cross-compliance         
Health check         
Animal         
Capital         
Income         
Labour         
Source: (Own arrangement)  
 
In order to analyze the information theories in chapter 2 was applied. The theory used in this 
study has its basis from a dissertation by Flaten in 2001.  
 
3.6 IFCN 
IFCN stands for International Farm comparison Network (Hemme et al. 2010, p.8). The aim 
of the network, which was established in 1997, is to link farm economic researchers together 
to facilitate the understanding of milk production in the world. In the IFCN-report from 2010 
143 farms in 44 countries were analyzed. A total of 86 countries are represented in the 
network (Hemme et al. 2010, p.1). The countries included in the network account for 85% of 
the total world production of milk (Hemme et al. 2010, p.13). By using this network the 
participants want to access information that makes it possible to examine the competitiveness 
of different farm types, regions and countries.  
 
3.7 How a typical farm is defined  
Models created in IFCN are separated depending on production line, eg. dairy, beef and arable 
crops (www, IFCN, 2009). When a typical farm in the IFCN network is defined the aim is to 
find a farm which represents a significant number of dairy farms in a region. The farm should 
be representative in terms of size, crops and forage grown, livestock systems, labour 
organization and the technology in the production system. The process of selecting a typical 
farm starts with identification of the region in a country where milk production is most 
important in terms of density of dairy cows or volume produced.  
 
In order to become classified as a dairy farm the majority of the farm income has to originate 
from milk. Milk production has to account for at least 50 per cent of the total gross-margin in 
the firm. IFCN usually strive to create two or sometimes three typical farms for each relevant 
farm type and country. One of the farms is average sized while the other one is an average of 
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values from larger farms. The larger average farm must represent a significant number of 
farms, account for a large share of production in the area and take advantage of economies of 
scale. Two of the types represent an average managerial performance while the third farm is 
an example of better management than average.  Out of these issues size is the most important 
aspect, which is measured in number of cows at the farm.   
  
The availability of reliable data is important to ensure the quality of the statistics concerning 
farm sizes (www, IFCN, 2009). In some regions where IFCN collects data problems to fulfill 
these goals may occur.  
 
There are four different methods to collect data to make it possible to create a typical farm 
(Hemme et al. 2010, p.194). The first one, which also is found to be the most appropriate, is 
labeled the “panel approach”. A reference group of local dairy farmers is chosen from the 
region with farms that are considered to have similar strategies, production and profits. The 
reference group also includes a local advisor. A person who is member of the IFCN network, 
or a person who is well-informed about the IFCN-model in combination with the reference 
group creates the typical farm. The farms created consist of extensive data according the 
structure of the farm including production results, income and expenses.  
 
In the second method used by IFCN the typical farm built up by only statistical data (Hemme 
et al. 2010). Statistical data from for example accountancy records are used by advisors and 
experts to construct a typical farm for each region. An alternative third method is to only use 
data from one farm. This data is discussed and adjusted by advisors and experts. The fourth 
method is a single farm case where a farm which doesn’t have to be typical may be selected. 
 
The Swedish farm which is used in this study is developed by using the first mentioned 
method (Hemme et al. 2010). It is important to be aware of the fact that that the farms chosen 
by IFCN cannot be viewed as an average farm for a specific country (Pers com. Hjellström 
2011). The typical farms are chosen according to conditions such as size, production and 
results. IFCN puts greater effort to show the origin of the data rather than using average 
values. It is also common that a typical farm achieves results that are above average in the 
region. The reason is that IFCN wants to study farms for a longer period of time and farms 
with low results are to a higher extent expected to experience liquidation. 
 
3.8 Description of the farm 
To compare the differences among dairy producers in the three countries a typical Swedish 
farm has been chosen to study. The farm has been provided by International Farm 
Comparison Network (IFCN) and has been evaluated using their standards. The farm is 
representative for its region and data is collected from several farms to represent an average 
farm in a specific area. The Swedish farm which is chosen is located in Falkenberg, Halland. 
It is a corporate farm with 220 cows. The farm will be used as a research object and 
differences in subsidies/taxes in accordance with equation (31) will be applied to study the 
effects.  
 
3.9 Empirical Model 
The model chosen for this study originates from Flaten (2001). The model has been chosen to 
assess the implication for different rules affecting the dairy farm. The model however differs a 
little from the original. In this model the farm is assumed to have sufficient quota and 
therefore the quota restriction has been removed from the planning problem. When milk 
production is not limited by the quota the restriction will lose its affect and it is therefore 
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removed. Another part of the equation that is different is the variable subsidy    , see 
equation (30), and the decoupled environmental subsidies      , see equation (31), which 
have been added. It should be noticed that this is a representation of program (31) which also 
results in equation (14) in order to create yearly results. 
 
Profit maximization of the production function for a farm 
       (31) 
                                                          
                              
 
    = Number of cows in production 
         = Total income from milk 
      = Decoupled subsidies and other subsidies not related to dairy 
      = Decoupled environmental subsidies 
             = Variable costs in dairy production with a variable subsidy due to   
tax reduction 
     = Capital costs per cow in production  
     = Coupled subsidies related to dairy production 
     = Yield of concentrated feedstuff kg per ha  
     = Area of concentrated feedstuff 
     = Area of forage or silage 
      = Variable cost per ha of concentrated feedstuff 
     = Variable cost per ha of forage or silage 
     = Price on concentrated feedstuff 
     = Total fixed costs 
 
In the model it is assumed that the typical Swedish dairy case farm is observed at the level 
where profits are maximized. In the analysis the effects of the different policies will be 
illustrated by the use of the case farm where the model is applied. In the analysis various 
subsidies and rules are compared to each other across the countries. The focus will be on the 
effects of government intervention. These effects can in the profit function be found in the 
decoupled subsidies      , decoupled environmental subsidies      , variable subsidies in 
the production (  ), subsidies related to the dairy production      and in the fixed costs     , 
see equation (31).  
 
When comparing the different rules/regulation and subsidies affecting the dairy farm the 
analysis initially focuses on one factor at a time. When comparing for instance the decoupled 
subsidies, (     among the different countries all other fixed and variable costs and revenues 
will remain constant independently of the different legislations. The only variable that affects 
profit for the farm is      . The different rules affect the profit differently and thereby the 
marginal cost for producing will be different. According to Porter (1985) having a cost 
advantage is one of three methods for gaining competitive advantage. Therefore, the 
legislation and subsidies which contribute the most to a higher profit will maintain production 
at the lowest marginal cost. 
  
The analysis also includes an aggregated comparison between the three countries systems. 
This analysis examines what type of country specific system that produces the highest net 
farm income for the case farm. The scenario which results with the highest net farm income 
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produces with the lowest cost. According to Porter (1985) the scenarios with the highest profit 
represent a competitive advantage and considered the most competitive.  
 
3.10 Reliability of the study  
To validate and increase the quality of this study has interviews with experts in the field been 
performed. The data in this study have been discussed with Danish, German and Swedish 
farmers and leading advisors to increase the reliability. 
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4 Background for the empirical study 
4.1 Exploring taxation in Europe 
In 2005/2006 the Dutch Agricultural Economics Research Institute (LEI) prepared a study on 
behalf of the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture (van der Veen et al. 2007, p.7). The study is a 
comparison between ten European countries to evaluate the competitiveness of the Dutch 
agricultural sector. The focus of the study is to evaluate how the tax system in the ten 
countries (Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, 
Poland, Spain and the United Kingdom) affect the competitiveness. Some tax systems are 
more favorable than others regarding specifics for the agricultural sector or overall and these 
differences affect the competitive position. The study compares the differences from several 
criteria’s that would define the system as more or less favorable. The competitive position 
was evaluated according to the following aspects in the study: 
 
- the overall tax burden is lower 
- investments and innovation is supported 
- large farms are discriminated positively due to economies of scale and structural 
development 
- successors pay a reduced price for a farm 
- older farmers are motivated to leave the agricultural sector 
 
When performing the study the authors found it close to impossible to assess and rank the 
different systems as favorable or unfavorable for the agricultural sector (van der Veen et al. 
2007, p.66). Due to the differences among the different tax systems a ranking would not be 
possible. Within a country the farms are quite different and differ in profitability, size, and 
capital intensity etc. These differences result in the tax systems having different effects upon 
each farm type although it is the same within each country. For example, if a certain aspect of 
taxation is relatively favorable in one country, for instance value adding tax (VAT), the 
capital levy might be unfavorable. The effect of these beneficial and unfavorable taxes might 
have a positive effect for some farms and negative to others due to size or capital intensity etc.  
 
The overall tax burden may also affect several other aspects such as the price of land (van der 
Veen et al. 2007, p.66). Another aspect is that higher taxes are often correlated positively with 
higher welfare, better infrastructure etcetera and does not necessarily have a negative effect 
on competitiveness. Therefore a ranking was not possible. However, the study provides 
insights into the different systems.  
 
Despite the above shortcomings, the authors found several aspects that affect the 
competitiveness within the agricultural sector (van der Veen et al. 2007, p.67). All countries 
included in the study had rules and regulations that especially favored the agricultural sector 
and therefore affected the competitiveness positively. The Dutch system had certain features 
that were found rather favorable compared to other countries such as a reduced tax burden if 
the farm was operated as a partnership.  Other rules regarded social security contributions and 
the total tax rates.  
 
The study found that the analyzed countries could be categorized into three different groups 
with the first being: Countries which have legislation in order to reduce the overall tax burden 
but no special rules for small farmer (van der Veen et al. 2007, p.69). Nevertheless, the 
regulations support various incentives for investments. The countries in this category were; 
Belgium, France, the Netherlands and the UK.  
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The second category consists of countries that apply a moderately supportive system; the 
countries in this category are Denmark, Germany and Poland. 
 
The third and last category represents countries which have a tax system that does not 
especially support its agricultural sector. The countries in this category are Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Spain.   
 
4.2 Measuring support to agriculture 
4.2.1 OECD indicators 
In year 1987 OECD developed indicators to measure support to agriculture in order to create 
a common method for comparing, monitoring and evaluating changes in agricultural policies 
(OECD 2010)(OECD 1999, p.1)(OECD 1999, p.1). The agriculture policies of the OECD 
countries have changed and become more complex and extensive during the last years. To 
ease understanding OECD introduced a classification system grouping policy measures 
depending on implementation criteria. This is made regardless of the objectives and effects of 
the policies.  
 
The members of OECD have agreed upon a policy towards liberalization of trade and a 
reduction of protection within the agricultural area (OECD 2010). To become successful in 
this work the OECD measures was developed. The indicator does not estimate measures for 
the individual countries within the EU, all countries are considered as one member of OECD. 
The indicators display the effectiveness and efficiency of policies by investigating if they 
fulfill the goals. Gross transfers from consumers and taxpayers to agriculture, which are 
caused by governmental policies that promote farmers, are considered as “support”.  Besides 
support that results in budgetary expenditures we find transfers that do not imply monetary 
disbursements. The OECD indicators cannot measure how a policy affects production, 
consumption, farm income, environment or trade. The different indicators are divided into 
three groups depending on the recipient of the support, which unit is used to measure and the 
type of aggregation. The EU countries use a relatively large amount of agricultural payments 
without requiring production compared to other OECD members (Le Thi 2010).  
 
The OECD indicators are grouped into three main categories to analyze the agricultural policy 
transfers (OECD 2010), see Appendix 6. The three categories are 1.supports intend to be 
transferred to the individual producer (PSE), 2. to all producers collectively (GSSE) or, 3. to 
consumers individually (CSE). All the definitions are “arising from policies that support 
agriculture, regardless of their nature, objectives or impacts on farm production or income” 
(OECD 2010, p.17). The definitions are quoted below. 
 
PSE (Producer Support Estimate): “The annual monetary value of gross transfers from 
consumers and taxpayers to agricultural producers, measured at the farm gate level.” (OECD 
2010, p.17). 
 
GSSE (General Services Support Estimate): “The annual monetary value of gross transfers to 
general services provided to agricultural producers collectively (such as research, 
development, training, inspection, marketing and promotion)” (OECD 2010, p.17).  
(transfers to individual producers are not included). 
 
CSE (Consumer Support Estimate): “The annual monetary value of gross transfers from (to) 
consumers of agricultural commodities, measured at farm gate level”(OECD 2010, p.17). 
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4.2.1 Classification of CAP 
The EU members are in a OECD perspective treated as one single member due to the fact that 
all countries apply the CAP (OECD 2010, p.19). Expenditures in the individual countries are 
classified as sub-national. The rural development policy in the EU is an example of support 
that partly is sub-national where EU member states have the possibility to add support at 
regional or local government level.  
 
At an OECD seminar on monitoring and evaluation of agricultural policies in Braunschweig, 
Germany, 28-29
th
 of September 2010 was the resent CAP reforms evaluated from an OECD 
perspective (Le Thi 2010).  The evaluation clearly shows that the EU countries budget a 
larger share of support to agriculture in the form of PSE compared to the total share within the 
OECD, see Figure 5.  
 
 
Figure 5 Total support in the EU, 2007-2009  
Source: (Le Thi 2010, p.5) 
 
The study is classifies some of the CAP supports using the OECD indicators. CAP consists of 
pillar 1, The European Agricultural Fund for Guarantee (EAFG) and pillar 2, The European 
Agricultural Fund for Rural Development. Support within pillar 1 is mainly classified as PSE 
consisting of the single payment which is classified as E. This means that the payment is 
based on historical production.  
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5. Taxation  
This chapter investigates differences in taxation systems among Denmark, Germany and 
Sweden. First an overall introduction to the three systems is provided. The second section 
describes how income is taxed as well as how the dairy farms income is taxed. The third 
section describes how capital gains are taxed and the fourth section corporate taxation. The 
fifth, sixth and seventh sections contain information of the levels of tax on energy, land and 
fertilizer. 
 
5.1 Taxation systems in the three countries 
Denmark, Germany and Sweden do all have a tax-to GDP ratio which is higher than the 
average in the EU (European Union, 2010, p.59). In year 2008 the overall tax ratio in the EU-
27 amounted to 39,3 per cent in the GDP weighted average (European Union, 2010, p.17), 
Figure 6. The EU tax levels are high compared to the other world economies, for example the 
tax levels in the United States and Japan are considerably lower (European Union, 2010, 
p.17). The overall tax ratio in EU has experienced an upward trend since the 1970s. Due to 
buoyant tax revenues in the late 1990s many countries took the possibility to lower the tax 
rates. The financial crisis, which increased in force in the second half of 2008, could be an 
explanation to the downward trend in total taxes during that year, see Figure 6 below. The 
data in Figure 6 below encompass the period up to year 2008 and therefore only show the 
effects in the beginning of the recession.  
 
 
Figure 6, Total Taxes (including Social Security Contributions) as per cent of GDP.  
Source:(European Union, 2010, p.290)  
 
Out of the three countries compared in this study Sweden and Denmark are the most similar 
in terms of taxation. To facilitate the evaluation of how the tax burden is distributed, taxes 
may be categorized into taxes on consumption, labour and capital (European Union, 2010, 
p.376). In order to define taxes by structure and type they often are separated into direct and 
indirect taxes (European Union, 2010, p.381). A definition on direct and indirect taxes is: 
 
” ´Direct taxes´ are defined as current taxes on income and wealth plus capital taxes 
including taxes such as inheritance of gift taxes. Income tax is a subcategory which 
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includes personal income tax (PIT) and corporate income tax (CIT) as well as capital 
gains taxes” (European Union, 2010, p.381). 
 
“ ´Indirect taxes´ are defined as taxes linked to production and imports i.e. as 
compulsory levies on producer units in respect of the production or importation of 
goods and services or the use of factors of production. They include VAT, import 
duties, excise duties and other specific taxes on services (transport, insurance etc.) and 
on financial and capital transactions. They also include taxes on production defined as 
´taxes that enterprises incur as a result of engaging in production´, such as professional 
licenses, taxes on land and building and payroll taxes”(European Union, 2010, p.381). 
 
Direct taxes are more easily “visible” to the voters because they consist of income taxes 
(European Union, 2010, p.19). The direct taxes are easier to use for redistribution by 
introduction of progressivity, which in some countries is practiced. This fact may be observed 
in Denmark were the share of direct taxes to total tax revenues is the highest in the Union. 
Germany is using a different system. Germany has one of the lowest share of direct tax 
revenues and instead a high share due to social security contributions.  
 
The higher personal income tax (PIT) is 37,5 per cent on average in the EU (European Union, 
2010, p.20). Of the three countries Sweden and Denmark has the highest with 56,4 per cent as 
maximum rate. Until the year of 2010 Denmark’s rate has been lowered to 51,5 per cent. 
Sweden and Denmark is unlike Germany imposing a so called Dual Income Tax system. The 
Dual Income tax system was developed in the 1980: and 90:s (Arnaldur Sölvi Kristjánsson 
2010, p.2). The system combines a progressive taxation of wage income with proportional 
taxation of capital income.  
 
Sweden and Germany are similar in the way that they have a large share of municipal taxes 
and other sub-federal taxes (European Union, 2010, p.21). The implicit tax rate on labour has 
decreased substantially in Sweden and Denmark since 1995, Table 3, Figure 7. The implicit 
tax rate on labour includes: “direct taxes, indirect taxes and compulsory actual social 
contributions paid by employers and employees, on employed labour income” (European 
Union, 2010, p.381). The implicit tax rate on labour should be considered as a measure that 
by approximation summarizes an average tax burden on labour.  
 
Table 3. Implicit tax on labour, 1995-2008, in per cent 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 95-08 00-08 
Den. 40,2 40,2 40,7 38,9 40,2 41 40,8 38,8 38,1 37,5 37,1 37,2 36,5 36,4 -3,7 -4,5 
Ger. 39,4 39,6 40,6 40,6 40,4 40,7 40,5 40,4 40,4 39,2 38,8 38,9 38,6 39,2 -0,3 -1,6 
Swe. 45,2 46,5 46,8 47,8 47 46 45,1 43,8 43,9 44 44,2 43,8 42,5 42,1 -4,9 -4,1 
Source (taxation trends in the European Union, p109)  
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Figure 7. Implicit tax rate on labour, 1995-2008  
Source (taxation trends in the European Union, p109)  
 
5.2 Income taxation 
Denmark, Germany and Sweden have developed the legislative system for income taxation in 
different ways. In the following section will it be showed how income are classified to make 
taxation possible. 
Germany separate earnings into seven different types according to Einkommensteuergesetz §2 
Umfang der Besteuerung, Begriffsbestimmungen, tax definition. (Anon n.d.)(Anon n.d.)  
 
1. Income from agriculture and forestry (Einkünfte aus Land- und Forstwirtschaft) 
2. Income from trade or business enterprises (Einkünfte aus Gewerbebetrieb) 
3. Income from professional and independent personal services (Einkünfte aus 
selbständiger Arbeit) 
4. Income from wages and salaries (Einkünfte aus nichtselbständiger Arbeit) 
5. Income from capital investments (Einkünfte aus Kapitalvermögen) 
6. Income from private property rentals (Einkünfte aus Vermietung und Verpachtung) 
7. Other income according to §22, such as interest, rents of pensions, speculative 
transactions etcetera (Sonstige Einkünfte im Sinne des § 22) 
Denmark separate income into three different types (Skatteministeriet 2008, p.10). 
1. Personal income 
2. Capital income 
3. Share income 
Sweden separate income into three other different categories (Gunnar Rabe 2007, p.10). 
4. Income from Employment (Inkomst av tjänst) 
5. Income from self-emplyment (Inkomst av näringsverksamhet) 
6. Capital gains (Inkomst av kapital) 
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In Figure 8 below is Denmark’s, Germany’s and Sweden’s tax rate for income illustrated.  
 
 
Figure 8, Tax rate of income in Denmark, Germany and Sweden depending on income 
 
5.2.1 Denmark 
The overall tax ratio in Denmark amounted to 48,2 per cent in 2008 which is the highest in 
the EU (European Union, 2010, p.181). High average and marginal tax rates are typical for 
personal income taxation in Denmark (European Union, 2010, p.182). An 8 per cent labour 
market contribution is paid for all personal income before deduction of any allowance. 
 
In Denmark the shares of social security contributions to total tax revenues are relatively low 
(European Union, 2010, p.19), see Figure 9. The reason is that most of the welfare costs in the 
country are financed out of general tax revenues.  This kind of system requires a high direct 
tax level, which can be noticed in the high taxes on income (European Union, 2010, p.181). 
Denmark has a system with a specific flat tax rate for each municipality. The average rate is 
25,5 per cent given that the church tax is included (European Union, 2010, p.182).  
 
Currently the Danish state income tax system is subject to a major change (European Union, 
2010, p.182). The reform reduces two tax brackets were the bottom bracket is 3,76 per cent to 
which an 8 per cent health tax is added, see Table 4. Before the 11,76 per cent is subtracted 
from positive net labour and capital income it is reduced with labour market contribution (8 
per cent) and a personal allowance of 5 760 Euro (DKK 42 900) or 4,25 per cent. If the 
positive net income exceeds the top threshold of 52 335 Euro (DKK 389 900) in year 2010 
that part will be levied with an additional 15 per cent tax.  
 
Table 4. Central government taxes and contributions in Denmark 
Tax measure 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Earned income tax credit 2,50% 4,00% 4,25% 4,25% 
Ordinary income tax, low bracket 5,48% 5,48% 5,04% 3,76% 
Additional income tax, medium bracket 6,00% 6,00% 6,00%  - 
Additional income tax, top bracket 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 
Healthcare contribution (ordinary income tax) 8,00% 8,00% 8,00% 8,00% 
Labour market contributions 8,00% 8,00% 8,00% 8,00% 
Source: (www, Skatteministeriet, 1, 2011)  
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Figure 9. Tax structure in Denmark 
Source (European Union, 2010, p.180)  
 
5.2.2 Germany 
The overall tax ratio in Germany is lower than Denmark but above the average in the EU-27 
(European Union, 2010, p.197). The tax-to- GDP ratio in Germany  amounted to 39,3 per cent 
in 2008. The social contribution in Germany accounts for a relatively high share of the total 
tax receipts, 38,6 per cent, see Figure 10. But when examined, the share of direct taxes and in 
particular the indirect taxes, the situation is the opposite. The shares are far below EU 
average. In year 2007 the trend was to shift from Social Security contributions to more direct 
and especially indirect taxes. The most pertinent example was a reduction in the 
unemployment insurance rate and an increase in the value added tax.  
 
The German progressive income tax system consists of three brackets at which the tax rate 
increases from 14 percent to 45 per cent depending on income and allowance (European 
Union, 2010, p.198). On top of this tax is a 5,5 per cent solidarity surcharge levied, an 
example at the bottom tax rate: 14 % *1,055 = 14, 7 %.  The German tax system has a basic 
allowance of 8 004 Euros in 2010 which is excluded from income tax. The lowest personal 
income tax rate, which as mentioned before is 14 per cent, was reduced from 15 per cent in 
2009 (European Union, 2010, p.198). Income that exceeds the middle bracket of 52 882 Euro, 
is levied with a tax rate of 42 per cent. In the top bracket tax rate of 45 per was applied. The 
top bracket applied for income exceeding 250 730 Euros in 2010.  
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Figure 10 Tax structure in Germany 
Source (European Union, 2010, p.196)  
 
5.2.3 Sweden 
The overall tax ratio in Sweden was 47,1  per cent in 2008 (European Union, 2010, p.261). 
The Swedish tax system has a higher share of indirect taxes then the Danish and German 
systems see Figure 11. Salaries in Sweden are subject to the employment tax which was 
introduced in 1960 as a percentage share of an employee’s salaries (www, Ekonomifakta 1 
2011). Since the 1970: s the employment tax has been more than 30 per cent and in the 
beginning of 1990: s it almost amounted 40 per cent. In 2009 the employment tax was set to 
31,42 per cent which will remain the same until 2011. Depending on age of the employee the 
tax varies, see Table 5.  
 
Table 5 Different levels of employment tax depending on age in 2010 
Age of employee Employment tax 
< 25 15,49 
25-65 31,42 
<65 10.21 
Source: (www, Swedish Tax Agency 2 2010)  
 
Self-employed are instead of employment tax required to pay social security contributions. In 
the year 2011 the social security contributions are set to 28,97 per cent (www, Ekonomifakta, 
2 2011). 
 
Municipal taxes are proportional and depend on where in Sweden the people live (www, 
Ekonomifakta, 4, 2011). The average municipal tax is today 31,55 per cent, which amounts to 
more than double of 14,63 per cent which was the average in year 1960. Today the municipal 
tax rate varies between 28,89 per cent and 34,17 per cent. Sweden practices a relatively 
progressive taxation of labour income (European Union, 2010, p.262). The top marginal rate 
can amount to 57 per cent given an average municipal tax rate.  
 
In 2007 the Swedish government introduced an in-work tax credit which during 2008, 2009 
and 2010 was increased (European Union, 2010, p.262). For persons less 65 years old the 
maximum tax credit is 2071 Euro (21 045 SEK) and over 65 years it is 2953 Euro (30 000 
SEK). 
33% 
29% 
38% Indirect taxes 
Direct taxes 
Social contributions 
34 
 
 
Individuals with an annual income exceeding 38 940 Euro (395 700 SEK) are required to pay 
state income tax in  amount of 20 per cent in addition to the municipal tax (European Union, 
2010, p.262). At this point the marginal tax amounts about 50 per cent (www, Ekonomifakta 
3, 2011). If the personal income exceeds 55 200 Euro (561 00 SEK) the state tax increases by 
5 per cent to a total of 25 per cent in addition to the municipal tax. These rules are same for all 
types of income, but for people which are older than 65 years the level is lower due to higher 
basic allowance at that age.   
   
 
Figure 11. Tax structure in Sweden 
Source (European Union, 2010, p.260)  
 
5.3 Taxation of farm income 
This section describes the most common way that the dairy farms are operated in Denmark, 
Germany and Sweden. 
 
5.3.1 Denmark 
In Denmark most dairy farms are operated as sole traders. However, instead of being taxed as 
personal income most farmers use an additional taxation scheme labeled company scheme 
(van der Veen et al. 2007, p.114). The company scheme enables the sole traders to choose a 
fiscal scheme that provides the same advantages as legal companies have. When using the 
company scheme all income and costs are included in the calculation. The most important 
benefit of the company scheme is that interest expenditures are fully deductible. The income 
from the business is then divided between business income and calculated capital gains. The 
amount which determines the capital gains is calculated by multiplying the net capital in the 
business with a short term interest rate. The rest of the income is taxed in the normal way. The 
company scheme however offers the possibility to save and carry forwards the capital income 
to activate later years.  
 
5.3.2 Germany 
The German farmer can organize the business as a sole trader or as partnership (Volkmar 
2009). As a sole trader the farmer is personally responsible for the entire business. The sole 
traders within the agricultural sector are subject to special regulations due to the fact that they 
are organized a bit differently compared to other organizations.  
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If farmers decide to collaborate they may create a companionship which is regulated 
according to the corporate law (Gesellschaftsrecht). This corporate law regulates private 
companionships, which aim to achieve a common purpose, by establishment of a contract 
(Gesellschaftsvertrag) between the parties.  
 
The corporate law allows six different organizational forms. The farm business runs 
according to private law or commercial law (Rydin & Nilsson 2000).  Most common is to 
practice business in agriculture as partnership due to private law. It gives the regular family 
farm benefits by allocating profits to the members and also makes it possible for them to 
claim personal allowances.  
 
The agricultural sector in Germany is allowed to use a different system concerning VAT (2, 
Landwirtschaftskammer Schleswig-Holstein 2010). The system is called “Pauschalierung” 
and means that the farmer when selling agricultural products is using a VAT of 10,7 per cent 
(LBD 2010). However, when purchasing inputs for the production the farmer is levied 7 per 
cent VAT on agricultural product such as grain and feed. When the farmer buys other 
products classified as non-agriculture a VAT of 19 % will be levied. The system implies that 
the farmer do not have to declare a difference for in- and outgoing VAT and in that way get a 
positive balance.  
 
In certain cases e.g. when farmers do large investments is it possible to change system and 
make an account for in- and outgoing VAT (Option zur Regelbesteuerung). The farmers can 
change between the systems but only every five years, so when choosing one of the systems it 
remains for a period of five years. 
 
5.3.3 Sweden 
A vast majority of the dairy farms in Sweden are operated as sole traders. As a business is a 
sole trader tax is paid on the profits which are the businesses earnings minus costs (www, 
European Commision 3 2010). In this business form the farmer is allowed to make fixed 
deduction of up to 25 per cent for cost for social contributions. The amount after the 
deduction is labeled operating surplus. The farmer cannot be employed in his or her own 
business and can therefore not withdraw a salary. The amount of money that the farmer 
withdraws to personal expenditures from the business is defined as own withdrawals. Own 
withdrawals can be made from the surplus after self-employed contributions, municipal and 
state tax is paid. Another form of business is corporation which is described later in section 
5.5.  
 
5.4 Capital levy 
Capital levy is a generic term for tax on income generated by dividends, interest income or 
other capital gains such as profits when selling shares (www, Ekonomifakta, 4, 2011). The set 
of rules regarding capital levy is often complicated and contain many exceptions and special 
cases. Many countries use progressive taxation when it comes to capital levy. A progressive 
taxation system implies that the tax rates increases as the income increases. Due to the 
complexity regarding comparisons of capital levies between countries become more difficult. 
However, a comparison of the highest and the lowest tax rates reveal some differences 
between the countries. In EU-27 the average maximum tax on capital levy was 25,7 per cent 
in 2008 (ibid.). The lowest average tax used in the EU-27 in 2008 amounted to 11,5 per cent.  
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5.4.1 Denmark 
Denmark does not have a specific tax for capital levies. All income generated from capital 
gains are included in the taxable income and are therefore taxed at the normal tax rate (PKF 
International Limited 2010, p.94). However, one exception is regarding profits from shares. In 
2009 profits from shares was taxed at three different levels depending on the size of the profit. 
The low bracket were in 2009 set at 48 300 DKK, profit up to the low bracket were taxed at a 
rate of 28 per cent (www, Skatteministeriet, 1, 2011). The medium bracket were set at 
106 100 DKK so profits between 48 300 – 106 100 DKK were taxed at 43 per cent. The top 
bracket is all profits above 106 100 DKK and the tax at this level were 45 per cent. During 
2010 the low bracket remained at 48 300 DKK and the tax at 28 per cent. At the same time 
the top bracket has been removed and the tax lowered. All profits from shares exceeding 
48 300 DKK are taxed at a rate of 42 per cent.  
 
5.4.2 Germany 
In Germany the rules regarding taxation of capital levy changed in 2009. Prior to 2009 the 
legislation was full of exceptions and a standard tax rate was difficult to define. However, as 
of January 2009 the rules changed and a flat rate of 25 per cent was set for most income 
generated from capital gains. Exceptions and special cases do still exist but are fewer with the 
new legislation. Income generated from capital gains such as dividends, income from interest, 
bonds and profits from sales of shares are all taxed at 25 per cent plus a surcharge of 5,5 per 
cent of the tax (25%*1,055) if the ownership is lower than 1 per cent (PKF International 
Limited 2010, p.142). The total tax on capital gains then becomes 26,37 per cent which is 
0,67 per cent higher than the average in EU-27. However, investments made prior to 2009 are 
not affected by the new rules and are taxed with the previous legislation even if the capital 
gains are realized after 2009. One exception with the new rules are sales from investments 
where the ownership exceeds 1 per cent. Capital gains from selling shares where the 
ownership exceeds 1 per cent are defined as taxable incomes. 60 per cent of the profits from 
capital gain are added to the individual’s annual gross income (ibid, p.141). The remaining 40 
per cent of the capital gain is not taxed. 
 
5.4.3 Sweden 
In Sweden the capital levy is 30 per cent. This is 4,3 per cent higher than the average in EU-
27 and is applies in most cases regarding capital levy. However, one exception that is 
common pertains to closely held companies (fåmansbolag). Dividends and capital gains from 
closely held companies are taxed lower at a rate of 20 per cent which also is the lowest 
possible tax for capital gains in Sweden. Corporations in the agricultural sector are often 
owned by few owners and are therefore taxed accordingly to the rules regarding closely held 
companies. Capital gains generated from companies however are already taxed once when 
paying corporate tax. For instance, a company with a profit of 100 000 Euros first has to pay a 
corporate tax of 26,3 per cent. That leaves the company with 73 700 Euros. If the rest is 
divided among the shareholder as dividend additional tax are 22 110 (73 700 * 0,3) Euros 
leaving the shareholders with 51 590 Euros. The total tax in this scenario are 48,41 per cent. If 
the company instead is a closely held company the corporate tax remains the same and the 
profit shared among the owners the additional tax are 14 740 (73 700 * 0,2) Euros leaving the 
shareholders with 58 960 Euros and a effective tax rate of 41,04 per cent.  
 
5.5 Corporate tax 
5.5.1 Denmark 
Denmark has gradually reduced its corporate tax rate between 2005 and 2007 from 30 per 
cent to 25 percent (European Union, 2010, p.183) which also remain the current rate in 2011 
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(www, Skatteministeriet, 2, 2011). Corporations in Denmark do not pay local taxes but 
instead a share of the corporate tax is transferred to municipalities. The tax depreciation for 
buildings used to be a straight line over a 20 years period (European Union, 2010, p.183). 
However, in 2008 the depreciation rate changed from 5 per cent to 4 per cent per year making 
the period 25 years. Depreciation for machinery and equipment is set to a maximum of up to 
25 per cent annually making which makes the fastest depreciation 4 years. In the evaluation of 
inventories the FIFO, (First in first out) basis is used.  
 
5.5.2 Germany 
In Germany the corporate income tax has been reformed several times in recent years. Prior to 
1999 there were rates of 45 per cent and today the tax has been reduced to 15 per cent 
(European Union, 2010, p.199). In addition to the 15 per cent a surcharge of the corporate tax 
is levied at a rate of 5,5 per cent (PKF International Limited 2010, p.140). In addition to the 
corporate tax all businesses pay a trade tax. However, this tax does not apply to agricultural 
operations or forestry establishment (European Union, 2010, p.199). The trade tax is 
determined independently by each municipality and the tax ranges from 7 – 17,5 per cent 
(PKF International Limited 2010, p.140) . The tax for businesses therefore varies but the 
corporate tax combined with the trade tax is normally around 30 per cent.  
 
5.5.3 Sweden 
The corporate tax in Sweden for a long period of time amounts to a flat rate of 28 per cent 
(European Union, 2010, p.263). However, in 2009 the tax was reduced and is now set at a flat 
rate of 26,3 per cent. Double taxation is eliminated or reduced for corporate shareholders. For 
individual shareholder of closely held companies a relief on dividends is granted. 
Corporations that generate capital gains are taxed as a regular income in the earnings 
statement. 
  
 
Figure 12 Adjusted top statutory rate on corporate income, 1995-2010  
Source: (European Union, 2010, p.136)  
 
5.6 Energy tax 
The price of energy varies between all countries and so do the taxation of energy. All three 
countries however have tax reductions for the agricultural sector. Hence the cost of energy 
differs among the countries. 
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5.6.1 Denmark 
The total energy tax in Denmark consists of two taxes, the energy tax and carbon dioxide tax. 
For these two taxes Danish farmers are provided a 100 per cent refund for the energy tax, but 
no refund on carbon dioxide (www, Skatteministeriet, 3 2011). In 2009 the total tax for 
electricity which includes energy tax and carbon dioxide tax was 9,2 cents/kWh of which 8 
cents/kWh was refunded.  
 
However in 2010 a new policy was initiated which changed the refund from 100 per cent to 
98,2 per cent (www, Price Waterhouse Cooper 2011). At the same time the energy tax was 
increased and the carbon dioxide tax decreased. The tax in 2010 amounted to 9,7 cents/kWh 
of which 8,7 cents/kWh was refunded. In 2011 supplementary fees has been added for 
environmental impact and the total tax increased. The cost per kWh is illustrated in Table 6 
below.  
 
Table 6 Tax on electricity in Denmark excl. VAT. Euro/kWh,  
2009: 1DDK = 7,446 Euro 
2010 : 1DDK = 7,447Euro 
 2011= 1DDK = 7,455Euro 
 Measures / Year 2009 2010 2011 
Energy tax 0,074 0,082 0,084 
CO2 tax 0,012 0,008 0,008 
Total tax 0,086 0,091 0,092 
Refund 0,074 0,081 0,082 
Cost after reduction 0,012 0,010 0,010 
Source: (www, Skatteministeriet, 3 2011)  
 
A reduction in energy tax is also available for fuel oil and diesel used in the production. Both 
diesel and fuel oil are affected by the new policies and there is a substantial tax increase 
between the new and old policy (www, Skatteministeriet, 3 2011). The total tax for diesel 
amounted in 2009 to 38,3 cents/liter of which 34,9 were refunded making the cost/liter 3,4 
cents. In 2010 the tax per liter increased to 39 cents and the reduction decreased to 32,7 cents 
making the tax per liter 6,3 cents, see Table 7  
 
Table 7.Tax on diesel fuel in Denmark excl. VAT. Euro/litre 
 Measures / Year 2009 2010 
Energy tax 0,349 0,333 
CO2 tax 0,034 0,055 
Nox tax 0,000 0,001 
Total tax 0,383 0,390 
Refund 0,349 0,327 
Cost after reduction 0,034 0,063 
Source: (www, Skatteministeriet, 3 2011)  
 
The situation for fuel oil is very similar to diesel, see Table 8. The new rules increase the tax 
per litre of fuel oil for the farmers with almost 75 per cent.  
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Table 8.Tax on fuel oil in Denmark excl. VAT. Euro/litre 
 Measures / Year 2009 2010 2011 
Energy tax 0,258 0,276 0,281 
CO2 tax 0,034 0,055 0,056 
Total tax 0,292 0,332 0,337 
Refund 0,258 0,271 0,276 
Cost after reduction 0,034 0,060 0,061 
Source: (www, Skatteministeriet, 3 2011)  
 
5.6.2 Germany 
The tax for electricity in Germany is 0,0205 Euro/kWh. The agricultural sector however is 
subject to a reduction in tax with 0,00513 Euro/kWh making the total cost 0,01537 
Euro/kWh, see Table 9 (Jordbruksverket 2, 2006, p.29). In order to be eligible for the tax 
reduction the agricultural business has to exceed a consumption of 48 000 kWh. In 2010 the 
tax refund was lowered from 0,0082 to 0,00513 Euros per kWh. 
 
Table 9. Tax on electricity in Germany excl. VAT. Euro/kWh 
Measures / Year  2008 2009 2010 2011 
Energy tax 0,0205 0,0205 0,0205 0,0205 
Refund 0,0082 0,0082 0,00513 0,00513 
Cost after reduction 0,0123 0,0123 0,01537 0,01537 
Source; (European Commission 1, 2011, pp.55 -59) 
 
The general tax for diesel in Germany is 0,4704 Euro/liter but for the agricultural sector a 
reductions exist. The reduction for the agricultural sector is 0,2148 Euro/liter making the total 
tax 0,2556 Euro/liter, see Table 10 below. (European Commission 1, 2011, pp.15-19).  
 
Table 10. Tax on diesel fuel in Germany excl. VAT. Euro/litre 
Measures / Year  2008 2009 2010 2011 
Energy tax 0,4704 0,4704 0,4704 0,4704 
Refund 0,2148 0,2148 0,2148 0,2148 
Cost after reduction 0,2556 0,2556 0,2556 0,2556 
Source; (European Commission 1, 2011, pp.15 -19) 
 
The tax on fuel oil in Germany is 59,99 Euro/1000 liter for business enterprises. For 
agricultural firms there exists a reduction of 8,18 Euro/1000 liter but it is only available if the 
tax for heating exceeds 511 Euro/year (Jordbruksverket 2, 2006, p.19).  
 
5.6.3 Sweden 
The tax on electricity in Sweden is subject only to energy tax. For the agricultural sector the 
energy tax that exceeds 0,00052 Euro/kWh (0,05 SEK) is refunded to the farmer 
(Jordbruksverket 2, 2006, p.21) making the tax close to nothing, see  
Table 11.  
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Table 11. Tax on electricity in Sweden excl. VAT. Euro/kWh 
Measures / Year  2008 2009 2010 2011 
Energy tax 0,02808 0,02655 0,02934 0,03183 
Refund 0,02756 0,02608 0,02882 0,03126 
Cost after reduction 0,00052 0,00047 0,00052 0,00056 
Source; (www, Swedish Tax Agency 2011)  
 
Diesel fuel is, in addition to energy tax, also subject to a carbon dioxide tax. Between 2007 – 
2010 79 per cent of the carbon dioxide tax was refunded but the energy tax was not refunded 
at all (www, Swedish Tax Agency 2011). As of January 1
st
 2011 the rules have changed. The 
refund for carbon dioxide tax on diesel fuel has been lowered to 70 per cent, see Table 12.  
 
Table 12. Tax on diesel fuel in Sweden excl. VAT. Euro/litre 
 Measures / Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Energy tax 0,159 0,150 0,166 0,201 
CO2 tax 0,300 0,283 0,316 0,339 
Total tax 0,459 0,433 0,482 0,540 
Refund 0,237 0,224 0,249 0,238 
Cost after reduction 0,222 0,210 0,232 0,303 
Source; (www, Swedish Tax Agency 2011)  
 
Fuel oil as well as diesel fuel is also subject to both energy tax and carbon dioxide tax. 
Between 2007-2010 79 per cent of the carbon dioxide tax and 100 per cent of the energy tax 
was refunded (www, Swedish Tax Agency 2011). The rules for fuel oil also changed from the 
1
st
 of January 2011 which affected the refund. The refund on the carbon dioxide tax and the 
energy tax was lowered to 70 per cent makes the cost increase substantially, see Table 13.  
 
Table 13. Tax on fuel oil in Sweden excl. VAT. Euro/litre 
Measures / Year  2008 2009 2010 2011 
Energy tax 0,079 0,075 0,083 0,090 
CO2 tax 0,300 0,283 0,316 0,339 
Total tax 0,379 0,358 0,399 0,429 
Refund 0,316 0,299 0,332 0,300 
Cost after  
reduction 0,063 0,059 0,066 0,129 
Source; (www, Swedish Tax Agency 2011)  
 
5.7 Land tax 
Taxation of agricultural land exists in both Denmark and Germany. However in Sweden, 
there is no tax on agricultural land and Sweden is therefore excluded from section 5.7. 
 
5.7.1 Denmark 
In addition to the other taxes Denmark has an annual national property tax 
(Ejendomsvaerdiskat) on owner-occupied dwellings. The tax is progressive and up to a 
official property value of 3 040 000 DKK the tax is 1 per cent. For the property value that 
exceeds 3 040 000 DKK the tax is 3 per cent. In addition to the property tax there is a land tax 
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(Grundskyld). However, if the land is used for agricultural production the tax rate is lowered 
(van der Veen et al. 2007, p.117).  
 
Before 2007 the tax was divided into two different parts, county land tax and municipal land 
tax. Both were based on the official property value (www, Statistics Denmark 2011). As of 
today the county land tax has been incorporated into the municipal land tax but it is still based 
on the official property value. The official property value is evaluated by valuation authorities 
that are assisted by the tax authorities. The official value should be 80 per cent of the market 
value and this value is determined every other year (van der Veen et al. 2007, p.117). During 
the years prior to 2007 the agricultural sector experienced continuously lower county tax 
rates. Whereas the normal county land tax was fixed at 1 per cent of the official value, the tax 
rate for agricultural land was lowered and in 2006 it amounted to 0,1 per cent (www, 
Statistics Denmark 2011). The municipal tax rate was also reduced for the agricultural sector 
and before the change in 2007 the municipal tax rate for normal properties varied between a 
minimum of 0,6 per cent and a maximum of 2,4 per cent. For agricultural land the municipal 
tax was reduced and set at a minimum of 0,6 per cent and a maximum of 1,2 per cent.  
 
In the rules from 2007 when the county tax has been incorporated, the municipal tax vary 
depending on municipality between 1,6 and 3,4 per cent (www, Statistics Denmark 2011). For 
agricultural land there is still a tax reduction which between 2007 – 2010 was 0,97 percent 
lower than the normal rate with a maximum of 1,23 per cent. For 2011 the rate has been 
lowered and is now reduced with 1,48 percentage of the normal rate with a maximum rate of 
0,72 per cent. 
 
5.7.2 Germany 
In Germany there is a land tax which is charged by each municipality (www, World Bank 
2003). The object of the land tax is building and domestic land including forestry and 
agricultural land. Public buildings and land, such as parks and hospitals are exempt from land 
tax.  
 
The calculation of the tax rate varies between the different municipalities. The tax rate is 
determined by a “standard tax” which is set by the state tax administration and it is the same 
for all municipalities (ibid.). The standard tax rate is acquired by multiplying a “base rate” 
with a “ratable value”. The base rate for forestry and agricultural land is 0,6 per cent. For all 
land registered in the cadastre an assessment of the ratable value is made. The “standard tax” 
is then the basis for the municipal tax. Each municipality applies a “leverage ratio” of which 
the standard tax is multiplied with.  
 
Ratable value * Base rate = Standard tax (assessed base value) 
 
Standard tax (assessed base value) * Municipal leverage ratio = Municipal land tax 
 
There are two types of land tax, land tax A and land tax B. Land tax A includes not only 
agricultural land and forestry but also all business related objects such as buildings live-stock 
and machinery (ibid.). Land tax B includes ancillary structures, buildings, owner-occupied 
dwellings and leaseholds.  
 
In 1964 there was a large census which also established ratable land values (ibid.). The values 
were obtained by gross-returns or construction values of land and buildings. The ratable value 
42 
 
for land in western Germany still remains the same as in 1964. For Eastern Germany a 
surrogate ratable value is used.  
 
The leverage factor which is determined by each individual municipality is different for 
“Land tax A” and “Land tax B” (ibid.). In Schleswig-Holstein the leverage rate is 250 per cent 
for Land tax A and for Land tax B is it 303 per cent. In 2006 the average land tax in Germany 
was 12 Euro per hectare (Jordbruksverket 2, 2006, p.41).  
 
5.8 Tax on fertilizer  
In Germany there is no tax on fertilizer and it is therefore not discussed further in this section. 
 
5.8.1 Denmark 
The tax on fertilizer in Denmark is 0,67 Euro per kilogram of nitrogen (Jordbruksverket 2, 
2006, p.33). Fertilizer which contains less than 2 per cent of nitrogen is exempt from the tax. 
The Danish system is based on fertilizer accounts. In the fertilizer account the farmer has to 
declare the use of nitrogen on the farm. The main purpose for the fertilizer account is to 
reduce the use of commercial nitrogen. Agricultural businesses with an annual turnover that 
exceeds 2 681 Euro and fulfills more than one determined criteria’s has to keep a fertilizer 
account. Three of the criteria’s is having more than 10 LU, having an animal density 
exceeding 1 LU per hectare or receiving more than 25 tons of manure annually (www, The 
Danish Food Industry Agency 5 2011). Farms may keep a fertilizer account on a voluntary 
basis. If the accounts are registered at “Plantdirektoratet” a farmer can apply to be exempt 
from the nitrogen tax which most farmers in Denmark are.  
 
5.8.2 Sweden 
Prior to 2010 there was a tax on fertilizer in Sweden. The tax is 0,19 Euro per kilo of pure 
nitrogen (Jordbruksverket 2, 2006, p.32). The tax was only administrated if the fertilizer 
contained more than 2 per cent nitrogen. In addition to the nitrogen tax there was a fee of 3,22 
Euro per gram of cadmium in the fertilizer that exceeded five grams per ton of phosphor. 
However, as of 1
st
 of January 2010 the tax on fertilizer was abolished.  
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6. Subsidies 
The Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) of today is divided into two so called pillars, product 
and price support is referred as 1
st
 pillar whereas rural development is referred as 2
nd
 pillar, 
see Figure 13 (European Commission 2, 2011). Pillar 1 is totally supported by the EU budget 
while the 2
nd
 pillar is financed through a multi-annual program where the member state has to 
partly finance the expenditures. The policies of the 2
nd
 pillar are common for all member 
states and the objectives are determined at EU level. However, it is possible for the member 
states to design the programs at national or even regional level. This gives the states 
possibility to ensure that the programs reach their targets by taking specific local conditions 
into consideration.  
 
 
Figure 13, Description of the CAP,   
Source: own arrangement of (Andersson et al. 2010)(European Commission 2, 2011, p.7)  
 
6.1 Single Payment Scheme (SPS) 
The system of single payments has it basis in the former “area aid scheme” which was 
introduced to adapt CAP to the market (Jordbruksverket 2 2010, p.5). In 1992 the intervention 
prices for agricultural commodities was reduced and partly replaced by direct payments 
(European Commission 2, 2011). These changes striving to make farming more market 
oriented are commonly labeled the Mac Sharry-reform (European Commission 3 2009). In the 
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year of 1999 a new reform called Agenda 2000 continued the development in this direction. 
The intervention prices were lowered with 15 per cent in two steps (Jordbruksverket 2 2010, 
p.41). In order to compensate farmers for the loss of income about half of the money was 
transferred to the area aid scheme.  
 
The area aid payments were designed to reduce surplus production and forced farmers to “set-
aside” some of their arable land (European Commission 4 1999). In the period of 2000-2006 
farmers had to take 10 per cent of their arable land out of food production. The payment per 
hectare was dependent on the yield of grain in each region. This resulted in high payments for 
farmers in regions with good yields of grain (Brady et al. 2007). This connection to the actual 
production level was an important feature of the Mac Sharry-reform. 
 
The Agenda 2000 initiated development of new objectives into CAP (European Commission 
4 1999). But it was first in year 2003 real changes took place through the Mid-Term Review 
(MTR) (Martí Massot 2010). MTR resulted in the (Krugman 1994). which introduced 
changes in CAP (www,  Europa, Summaries of EU legislation 2008). Before, payments were 
related to the farm coupled to the farm size, production and number of livestock. The new 
system aims at decouple payments from production and create a single payment scheme.  
 
The payment each member state has previously received as support for production constitutes 
the reference amount which is used as a ceiling for the Single Payment Scheme (SPS) (Martí 
Massot 2010, p.2). By using this amount as a basis the Single Payment entitlement per hectare 
was calculated. The number of entitlements for each farmer is calculated depending on the 
number of qualified hectares of land he/she cultivates. The member states are obliged to keep 
a national reserve through the use of a linear deduction schedule that amounts 3% of the total 
funds intended for single payments.  This reserve shall be used to compensate farmers who 
recently started or farmers with unusually low amount of entitlements e.g. newly established.   
 
The Single Payment Scheme makes it possible for the farmers to adjust production to market 
demand without worrying of their sustenance (Martí Massot 2010, p.2). Decoupling all 
payments that corresponded to the former support is known as the historical model. The 
regional decoupling method implies that all farmers in a region receive the same level of 
payment per hectare. The payment consists of an equal share of the total payment in the 
region during the reference period. Another possibility for the member states is to combine 
the two models either by applying different systems in different regions of the country or by 
using a system which partly uses historical data and partly use a fixed rate.  
 
The hybrid model may vary over time depending on the ongoing implementation of the single 
payment scheme resulting in a dynamic or static model. Countries that introduced a dynamic 
hybrid model are aiming to change to the regional model over time (Jordbruksverket 2 2010, 
p.7). Those who use the static hybrid model have the possibility to maintain different levels of 
regionalization in their models. The new member states apply a simplified single area 
payment scheme (SAPS) due to the fact that they do not have any historical reference points. 
However, the new member states are forced to convert and adapt their systems to the single 
payment scheme. Each countries choice of model is specified in Table 14. 
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Table 14. The EU-15 countries choices of model for single payment scheme 
Historical:  Austria, Belgium, Spain, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands and within 
the UK, Scotland and Wales 
Regional:  Malta, Slovenia 
Hybrid : Dynamic: Germany, Denmark, Finland, England 
 Static: Luxemburg, Sweden 
Source: (Jordbruksverket 2 2010, p.7)  
 
Most countries converted to this new system in 2005 or 2006 with an exception of the new 
member states (Jordbruksverket 2 2010, p.7). Denmark, Germany and Sweden converted in 
2005. To prevent land from becoming unused the member states had some possibilities to 
decide how fast they want to implement the single payment scheme (BMELV, 1, 2006, p.15).   
 
The MTR reform in 2003 implies a full decoupling of CAP (Martí Massot 2010). The health 
check of the CAP in 2009 confirmed the idea of decoupling and states that those countries 
who have kept some payment schemes coupled will have to remove them before the year of 
2012. Specific support systems which still are linked to production will therefore be reduced 
gradually and disappear. The premium for suckling cows, ewes and goats is excluded from 
the reform and may be kept.  
 
There are five objectives that a member state could refer to as a justification for altering 
subsidies to become coupled again (Martí Massot 2010, p.3). It is possible to keep up to 10 % 
of the national envelop for this purpose. The objectives to which a country can refer to are 
(Martí Massot 2010, p.3): 
 
1. Environment, quality or marketing of products. 
2. Addressing to geographical or sectoral handicaps 
3. Revaluing of decoupled payments per hectare in areas were risk for abandonment of 
agriculture occurs 
4. Partly payments to ease insurance premiums covering risks in arable crop sector.  
5. Contributes to mutual fund purposing to defend against plant and animal diseases. 
  
Cross-compliance 
The MTR reform of 2003 also contains provisions of cross-compliance, which require 
farmers to comply with certain environmental and agricultural conditions which are stipulated 
by each member state (Martí Massot 2010, p.3). The conditions should be fulfilled whether 
the farmer actually produces anything or not at the land. The rules should be stipulated in a 
way that restrict soil erosion, maintain soil structure, soil organic substance levels and ensure 
that the farmers maintain the land above the minimum level of maintenance.  
 
In order to receive the payments, rules concerning environmental issues, maintaining good 
standards on the land, and to comply with the rules of public health, animal welfare, crop 
protection and environmental-friendliness, have to be considered according to Council 
Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 (www,  Europa, Summaries of EU legislation 2008).  
 
If a farmer, due to negligence, does not comply with the rules the payment might be reduced 
by 5 % (www,  Europa, Summaries of EU legislation 2008). However, if the farmer does it by 
purpose the reduction may exceed 20 % and the farmer might be completely excluded from 
any payments.  
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According to Council Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 all member states are obliged to 
implement a system for advisory services not later than January 1, 2007. The advisory 
services are purposed to help producers to comply with the cross-compliance rules.  
 
In 2009 the relevance of the rules of cross-compliance was questioned and in the new 
(Council regulation (EC) no 73/2009 n.d.)some of the rules from 2003 changed. A farmer 
should keep cautious about following rules of five categories: 1. Environment, 2. Public and 
animal health, identification and registering of animals, 3. Public-, animal health and crop 
protection, 4. Registration of diseases, 5. Animal welfare. These five concerns are followed 
by requirement of keep maintenance of agriculture land fulfill environmental concerns.  
 
Modulation 
During the period from 2005 until 2012 the Single payments are reduced every year in entire 
EU except some payments to farmers in the outer zones and islands in the Aegean Sea (www,  
Europa, Summaries of EU legislation 2008). The reduction of payments is called modulation 
and aim to allocate assets among member states to be used in 2
nd
 pillar, the European Rural 
Development Fund, see section 6.2. At first the Agenda 2000 reform made it optional for 
member states to apply modulation voluntary. When regulation (EC) No1782/2003 came into 
force modulation became compulsory for all farmers within the EU-15. Farmers receiving 
less than 5000 Euro are not affected.  
 
At least 80 % of the amount deducted due to modulation will be distributed among the 
member states to be used for rural development through the European Agricultural Fund for 
Rural Development (EAFRD) (www,  Europa, Summaries of EU legislation 2008). Some 
countries retrieve 90 % of their modulated amount due to the crisis in the rye sector. Germany 
is the superior rye producer within the EU-15 and due to this receiving back 90 % (BMELV, 
1, 2006, p.12). The extra funds received shall exclusively be used for arrangements in regions 
where rye usually is cultivated. The remaining 10 - 20 % is distributed among the 15 
countries according to the objectives concerning area farmed, agricultural employment and 
GDP/capita in terms of purchasing power (Martí Massot 2010, p.4).  
 
After the “health check” in 2009 some arrangements in the modulation scheme were changed 
(Martí Massot 2010, p.4). The initial modulation rate rose from 5 % in 2008 to 12% in 2012, 
see Table 15. Payments above 300 000 Euros become subject to an additional reduction of 4 
% per year. Funds removed by this extra reduction will be used within each country for 
specific rural development policies.  
 
Table 15. Modulation of SPS in EU 2005-2012 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Modulation -3% -4% -5% -5% -7% -8% -9% -10% 
Source: (BMELV, 1, 2006, p.73)(www, ZID, 2011) 
 
Disbursements 
The Single payments are disbursed between 1 December and 30 June the year following the 
application (www,  Europa, Summaries of EU legislation 2008). Some additional payments 
could be postponed as long as until 30 September. The maximum total payment for each 
country is specified in Table 16. 
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Table 16. Maximum single payment for each country in millions Euro 
Year  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Denmark 1015 1021 1027 1030 1030 
Germany 5647 5696 5744 5770 5744 
Sweden 671 755 760 763 763 
Source: (www,  Europa, Summaries of EU legislation 2008)  
  
Each country is obliged to keep reserves to prevent land from becoming unused and 
uncultivated, but also to support new farmers that enter and finally to overcome other special 
circumstances.  
 
The SPS payments are based on former payments during a reference period. Most common is 
the period from 2000 until 2002, but in some cases the period 1997-1999 applies. The base for 
the payments are former payments related to land, premiums to reduce seasonal differences, 
slaughter premium, special premium for male bovines, suckling cow premium and premium 
for dairy products. 
 
6.1.1 Basic payment entitlement  
This section clarifies which basic amounts of Single Payments farmers in Denmark, Germany 
and Sweden receive for cultivating their land.  
 
6.1.1.1 Denmark 
The main subsidy in Denmark is as in the two other countries the “Single Payment Scheme” 
(Enkeltbetaling) which in 2005 replaced the “Area Aid Scheme” (Hektarstøtten) (Ministry of 
Food, Agriculture and Fisheries 1 2010, p.4). In order to receive subsidies in form of the 
Single Payment Scheme (SPS) the recipient has to control agricultural land and have payment 
entitlements. The SPS is only valid for areas used as productive agricultural land or land kept 
in good agricultural- or environmental condition. The size of the SPS varies depending on the 
value of the payment entitlements.  
 
The payment entitlements may be traded directly between farmers without the involvement of 
Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fishery (MFAF). However, when traded MFAF has to be 
informed and the reason being that the payment entitlements have to be registered to the 
farmer applying for the SPS. The values of the basic payment entitlements are specified in 
Table 17. 
 
Table 17. Value of basic payment entitlements per hectare in Denmark 
Measures / Year   2010 2011 
Cultivated / uncultivated land  299,13€/ha 302,14€/ha 
Pasture land    282,40€/ha 295,84€/ha 
Source: (Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries 1 2010, p.29)  
 
6.1.1.2 Germany 
Single payments (Direktzahlung) and other forms of subsidies are of considerable importance 
to German farmers (www, Ministerium für Landwirtschaft, Umwelt und ländliche Räume 1 
2011). The EU single payment scheme accounts for the largest share of all payments.  In 
addition a tax relief on diesel fuel for the agricultural sector exists. 
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Single payment scheme 
The reform of the agricultural policy decided by EU in 2003 was introduced in Germany 2005 
(BMELV, 1, 2006, p.5). Germany took the possibility to decouple all the premium payments 
such as milk supplement and livestock supplement for suckling cows, ewes and male bovines 
(www, meine-milch 2, 2011). The regional acreage premium in Schleswig-Holstein before the 
historical “top ups” was added was 304.61 Euro/ha for arable land and 79, 80 Euro/ha for 
permanent grassland, see Table 18 (van Stolk et al. 2006, p.6).  
 
Table 18. Regional area payments per hectare without additive entitlements based on historical production,2005 
Region 
Arable land 
€/ha 
Grassland 
€/ha 
Baden-Würtemberg 303,82 72 
Bayern 298,46 88,34 
Berlin/Brandenburg 269,65 68,49 
Hessen 300,39 61,58 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 308,5 59,84 
Niedersachsen/Bremen 255,12 99,75 
Nordrhein-Westfalen 267,7 104,95 
Reinland-Pfalz 276,89 48,45 
Saarland 280,55 53,86 
Sachsen 309,76 111,2 
Sachsen-Anhalt 317,18 97,69 
Schleswig-
Holstein/Hamburg 304,61 79,8 
Thüringen 322,1 80,52 
Source: (www, Federal Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Consumer Protection 2011) (www, 
Federal Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Consumer Protection 2011) (BMELV, 2, 2011) 
 
Germany chose to decouple subsides by using a dynamic hybrid model until 2009. This 
model is 65% based on historical values and 35 % regional values. During the period 2009 
until 2013 the dynamic hybrid model is gradually transferred into a regional model.  
 
All extra entitlements are to be transferred to the SPS and final regional premium for 2013 as 
calculated, see Table 19. This conversion results in a totally decoupled production and 
regional model in 2013.  
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Table 19. Final value per hectare using regional model 2013 for the Single payment (Direktzahlungen) . 
Region 
Final reference 
value 2013, €/ha 
Baden-Würtemberg 308,05 
Bayern 354,55 
Berlin/Brandenburg 300,3 
Hessen 299,58 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 329,44 
Niedersachsen/Bremen 352,38 
Nordrhein-Westfalen 359,44 
Reinland-Pfalz 294,54 
Saarland 258,96 
Sachsen 357,26 
Sachsen-Anhalt 354,97 
Schleswig-
Holstein/Hamburg 358,83 
Thüringen 346,35 
Source: (www, Federal Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Consumer Protection 2011) (www, 
Federal Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Consumer Pro tection 2011)(www, Federal Ministry 
of Food, Agriculture and Consumer Protection 2011) (BMELV, 2, 2011) 
 
The conversion from the dynamic hybrid model to a regional model provides all farmers 
within each “Bundesland” with the same payment per hectare independent of what they 
produce 2013 (www, meine-milch 2, 2011). The difference between the individual farmers’ 
payments in 2009 and the reference values in Table 19 are modulated until 2013. The 
modulation amounts to 10 % in 2010, 30% in 2011, 60 % in 2012 and 100% in 2013. The 
average payment at a German farm is expected to amount to 340 Euro per hectare in 2013 
(www, meine-milch 2, 2011). 
 
Schleswig-Holstein 
In year 2008/2009 the average level of national and EU supported subsidy payments in 
Schleswig- Holstein was 394 Euro per hectare utilized agricultural area, UAA (www, 
Ministerium für Landwirtschaft, Umwelt und ländliche Räume 1 2011). The single payment 
accounts for 359 Euro (91 %) of the subsidies. The average farm in Schleswig-Holstein 
consist of 81 hectares of agricultural land with a subsidy level which in 2008/2009 amounts to 
32 000 Euro per farm. The level of the payment is less than average in Germany which is 429 
Euro.  In the southern part of Germany, Bayern and Baden-Württemberg, the payment is 
much higher. It amounts to 508 Euro respectively 444 Euro, after all types of subsidies are 
included. 
 
6.1.1.3 Sweden 
All agricultural land in Sweden has the possibility to qualify for the single payment 
(Jordbruksverket 2011b, p.23). To be eligible for payment, entitlements to the land are 
needed, these also accounts for the value of the payment (www, Jordbruksverket 1 2011). The 
entitlements can be rented or traded directly between farmers. It is also necessary to keep the 
land in good condition free from bushes, trees and to maintain good drainage to fulfill the 
rules of cross-compliance. 
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The payment entitlements are destined to a specific region which means that you can only use 
them in that region (www, Jordbruksverket 1 2011). The values of the entitlements depend on 
the region where they are located, see Table 20 and Table 21.  
 
Table 20 Payments per hectare for arable land per region in Sweden 
Region 2008 2009 2010 2011 
1.       276 €/ha 276 €/ha 278 €/ha 280 €/ha 
2.        239 €/ha 239 €/ha 242 €/ha 243 €/ha 
3.        200 €/ha 200 €/ha 202 €/ha 204 €/ha 
4.        158 €/ha 158 €/ha 160 €/ha 161 €/ha 
5.        126 €/ha 126 €/ha 128 €/ha 128 €/ha 
Source; (www, Jordbruksverket 1 2011)  
 
 Table 21 Payment per hectare for pasture land per region in Sweden 
Region 2008 2009 2010 2011 
1.        143 €/ha 149 €/ha 145 €/ha 146 €/ha 
2.        122 €/ha 122 €/ha 125 €/ha 126 €/ha 
3.        123 €/ha 123 €/ha 126 €/ha 126 €/ha 
4.        126 €/ha 126 €/ha 129 €/ha 129 €/ha 
5.        126 €/ha 126 €/ha 128 €/ha 128 €/ha 
Source (www, Jordbruksverket 1 2011)  
 
6.1.2 Individual payment entitlements 
The value of payment entitlements may vary as a result of coupled subsidies becoming 
decoupled. The payment entitlement is therefore increased by coupled subsidies such as 
livestock supplement, milk supplement and sugar supplement (Ministry of Food, Agriculture 
and Fisheries 1 2010, p.29). As a result of more decoupled animal subsidies many payments 
have been transferred from coupled subsidies to individual payment entitlements. (Ministry of 
Food, Agriculture and Fisheries 1 2010, p.29). In 2000-2002 there was a reference period for 
production subsidies related to livestock production. 
 
6.1.2.1 Denmark 
The value of the individual payment entitlements cannot exceed 5000 euro per hectare.  
 
Livestock Supplement 
Between the period 2005 – 2008 the annual payment amounted to 100 per cent of the 
supplement value for decoupled male bovine premium, slaughter premium and extensification 
premium (Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries 1 2010, p.29). Between 2009 – 2012 
there is an annual reduction of 14,06 per cent on the share of decoupled entitlements that 
relate to the former livestock premiums, see Table 22. The reduction of the payment is 
transferred to payments for grassland.  
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Table 22. Annual reduction of livestock supplement in per cent in Denmark 
Supplement 
2005-2008 
Supplement 
2009 
Supplement 
2010 
Supplement 
2011 
Supplement 
2012 
100 % 85,94 % 71,88 % 57,81 % 43,57% 
Source; (Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries 1 2010, p.29)  
 
Livestock units  
In order to use individual payment entitlements without land these may be exploited as long 
as a production of at least 50 per cent of the requirement is quota of livestock units (LU) 
which was set in 2005 is fulfilled (Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries 1 2010, p.32). 
If the livestock production is lower than the requirements the farmer will no longer be eligible 
for the payments. Livestock units are measured as follows: 
 
 Male animals (bulls and steers) and heifers from 24 months, dairy cows and suckling 
cows: 1 LU 
 Male animals (bulls and steers) and heifers from 6 months to 24 months: 0,6 LU 
 Bovine under 6 months: 0,2 LU  
 
Slaughter premium 
In 2000 a slaughter premium for bovine was introduced. This premium included bulls, steers, 
cows and heifers, eight months or older (Jordbruksverket 2006, p.133). There was also a 
slaughter premium for calves younger than 7 months or a weight below 152,5 kg. The 
premium for adult animals older than 8 months was 80 Euro per animal and for calves 50 
Euro per animal. However, in 2005 the slaughter premium was transferred from a coupled 
subsidy to a decoupled subsidy. The payments were subsequent transferred to an individual 
payment entitlement and the value of the entitlements was based on the average number of 
delivered animals during a reference period. The reference period was between the years 
2000-2002.  
 
Extensification premium 
In 2000 an extensification premium was introduced as an additional subsidy for producers 
who were recipients of male bovine premium or suckler cow premium (www, European 
Commision 2 2002). To qualify for this subsidy the density of the production had to be less 
than 1,4 LU per hectare of feed area per calendar year. The payment from the extensification 
premium amounted to 100 Euro per delivered animal. In 2005 the extensification premium 
was like many other subsidies transformed from a coupled subsidy to a decoupled subsidy. 
The payment was just like the slaughter premium transferred to individual entitlements. The 
amount transferred to individual entitlements was based on the average number of livestock 
delivered during a reference period between the years 2000-2002. 
 
Animal subsidies (Coupled) 
The main production related subsidy in Denmark is a special premium for male bovine. This 
is one of few remaining production related subsidies and it is also an EU-related subsidy.  
The male bovine premium were in 2010 for bulls 157,5 Euro/bull and for steers with one male 
bovine premium 112,5 Euro/steer, with two male bovine premiums 225 Euro/steer. 
 
6.1.2.2 Germany 
In 2005 the following premium payments existed with the exception of a milk premium and 
livestock premium for suckling cows, ewes or male bovines condensed to one entitlement 
(www, meine-milch 2, 2011). 
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Livestock Supplement 
All cattle supplements (premium for male bovine, slaughter premium and extensification 
supplement) were decoupled in 2005 (Jordbruksverket 2007, p.48).  The values of individual 
payment entitlement were based at the average production the farmer had during the reference 
period 2000-2002 (BMELV, 1, 2006, p.16).  Male bovine, slaughter and suckler cow 
premium was transferred to the single payment which is related to the land. 
 
Slaughter premium 
Same as Denmark, see 6.1.2.1 
Calves which were younger than 7 months or weighed below 152,5 kg: 50 Euro/animal 
Adult cattle: 80 Euro/animal 
Reference period: 2000-2002 
 
Extensification premium 
Same as Denmark, see 6.1.2.1 
 
Animal subsidies (coupled) 
All coupled animal based subsidies for cattle are abolished in Germany.  
 
6.1.2.3 Sweden 
Livestock Supplement 
An additional value is placed upon the entitlement depending on extra payments allocated in 
2005 due to historical payments in the years 2000-2002 (www, Jordbruksverket 1 2011). 
Some farmers also received some extra subsidies from a national reserve. Those are primarily 
intended to support farmers who rented out their land since 2002 or earlier and therefore did 
not apply for entitlements in the year of the introduction, 2005  (www, Jordbruksverket 2 
2011).  
 
Slaughter premium 
Same as Denmark, see 6.1.2.1 
Calves which were younger than 7 months or weighed below 152,5 kg: 50 Euro/animal 
Adult cattle: 80 Euro/animal 
Reference period: 2000-2002 
 
Extensification premium 
Same as Denmark, see 6.1.2.1 
 
Animal Subsidies  
The only production related subsidy in Sweden is a premium for male bovine (www, 
Jordbruksverket, 3 2011). The male bovine premium was in 2010 111 Euro per bull and for 
heifers with one entitlement were 111 Euro per steer and with two entitlements 222 Euro per 
steer. In 2012 the male bovine premium will be decoupled and is transferred to payment 
entitlements as “top ups”. The magnitude of the “top ups” will be decided from the average 
number of animals delivered during a reference period 1
st
 of October 2009 – 31st of December 
2011.  
 
6.1.3 Milk premium 
In 2004 as a result of the 2003 CAP reform it was decided to reduce the intervention prices 
for butter and skimmed milk (www, European Commision 2011). As a result of lowered 
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intervention prices the market would react with a reduction of the market price. Therefore, a 
support payment was introduced. The payments were paid out per calendar year and consisted 
of two elements, dairy premiums and additional payments. The dairy premium was equal for 
all milk producers but the additional payment was decided by each member state which also 
defined individual criteria for the additional payment.  
 
When the new payment was introduced it was decided that the dairy payments had to be 
included in the Single Payment Scheme. The SPS could be introduced in either 2005, 2006 or 
2007 and the dairy payments had to be included by no later than 2007 (www, European 
Commision 2011). When introducing the SPS each member state was given a “national 
ceiling” which determined a total amount for the SPS. A member state however was allowed 
to retain up to 10 per cent of the national ceiling. These 10 per cent could then be 
redistributed under certain conditions to the same sector and therefore resulting in different 
payments. The values in this section have been recalculated to Euro according to exchange 
rates in Appendix 1.  
 
6.1.3.1 Denmark  
In 2004 the Danish premium were 1,14 cent/kg where 0,8 cent was the milk premium and 
0,34 cent a supplement (www, The Danish Food Industry Agency 1 2011). The payment was 
only disbursed in 2004. In 2005 the milk premium was replaced with a milk supplement. The 
new milk supplement was based on the previous milk premium and the payment for 2005 
which amounted to 1,41 cent/kg quota see Table 23 (www, The Danish Food Industry Agency 
2, 2011). In 2006 and forward the milk supplement payment was decoupled and included in 
the individual payment entitlements. The value of the payment in 2006 and onwards was 
determined to 2,59 cent/kg quota (www, LandbrugsInfo, 1, 2011).  
 
Table 23 Value of milk premium in Denmark 
Year Payment 
2004 1,14 cent/kg 
2005 1,41 cent/kg 
2006 2,59 cent/kg 
Source: (www, The Danish Food Industry Agency 2, 2011)  
 
6.1.3.2 Germany 
A subsidy for milk producers was introduced in 2004 (www, meine-milch 2, 2011). In 2006 
the payment was decoupled and transferred to individual payment entitlements. The current 
payment is based on a reimbursement for each kilo of milk quota that the farmer owned in 
2006 when the premium became decoupled, see Table 24.  
 
Table 24. Value of milk premium in Germany 
Year Payment 
2004 1,182 cent /kg 
2005 2,386 cent/kg 
2006 3,55 cent/kg 
Source: (www, meine-milch 2, 2011) 
 
6.1.3.3 Sweden 
The Swedish Milk Premium was decoupled later than both Denmark and Germany. In 2007 
the milk premium was altered from being production based and transferred to the single 
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payment scheme. The value of the milk premium which was transferred was 2,27 cent/kg of 
quota held  in March 2007, see Table 25 (www, Jordbruksverket 4 2011). 
 
Table 25. Value of milk premium in Sweden 
Year Payment 
2004 1,18 cent /kg 
2005 1,60 cent/kg 
2006 2,27 cent/kg 
Source:(Regeringen 2004)  
 
6.2 Rural development  
The 2
nd
 pillar is as mentioned in section 6.1 containing the rural development policies 
according to Council Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005. The subsidies in the 2
nd
 pillar are co-
financed between national and EU level (European Commission 2, 2011). The aim of the 
European Rural Development Fund is to make it possible to address measures to support 
certain purposes. The objectives are determined in EU level but implemented through national 
or regional programs that run for seven years. Existing programs thus runs for the period 
2007-2013 which coincides with the multi annual framework for the European Union. Each 
program contain three themes often referred to as the three “axis”, see Figure 13:  
 
1. Improving competiveness by investing and modernizing  
2. Maintaining rural environment  
3. Improving quality of life in rural areas and encourage diversification.  
The member states are also obliged to ensure that the so called “Leader approach” is 
implemented. The approach has to include all the axis and encourage local development were 
local people are engaged in the projects.  
 
The member states have the possibility to choose how they want to spend their funds. But the 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005 stipulates a minimum spending level for each axis: 
25 % agri-environmental measures (and measures for less favored areas), 10 % 
competitiveness and 10 % rural development, see Figure 13. 
 
The money transferred from 1
st
 pillar to 2
nd
 pillar, the so called modulation, has increased 
since the start in 2003. The modulation is strengthening the rural development fund 
(EAFRD).  
 
The values in this section have been recalculated to Euro according to exchange rates in 
Appendix 1. 
 
6.2.1 Agri-environmental measures 
The agri-environmental measures, part of axis 2, stand for the largest share of the rural 
development measures.  
 
6.2.1.1 Denmark 
All agri-environmental measures which are financed through the rural development program 
are based on commitments that extend for five year periods (Ministry of Food, Agriculture 
and Fisheries 2 2010, p.6).  
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Extensive farming 
Payment for extensive farming in 2010 and 2011 are 110€/ha. In order to be eligible for 
extensive farming subsidies the land has to be cultivated in a certain manner, see Table 26. No 
pesticides, herbicides or fungicides are allowed unless if they are allowed for organic 
production (Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries 2 2010, p.6). The use of nitrogen has 
to be decreased and a “Nitrogen plan” has to exist.  
 
Table 26 Value per hectare for agri-environmental subsidies in Denmark 
Preservation of permanent grassland  2010 2011 
When area is grazed 188€/ha 188€/ha 
When area is harvested 108€/ha 108€/ha 
      
Area with selected environment with difficulties  
to reach and commitment to grazing 
 
445€/ha 
 
     - 
   
Area that is designated as bird friendly an annual  
supplement can be added 
 
80€/ha 
 
     - 
Source: (Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries 2 2010, p.6)  
 
Permanent pastureland is land that is used for growing grass or other forage on either natural 
or cultivated basis (Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries 2 2010, p.20). However, the 
land has to have been kept outside the farms crop rotation for at least five years. Land that has 
been used for growing grass or other forage crops during the last five years is also included. 
 
Support for reducing nitrogen leaching 
The Danish regulation requires all farms that exceed a certain size to attain and register for a 
so called fertilizer account (Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries 4 2010, p.3). All 
farmers who are part of this accountancy system are obligated to grow catch crops at a 
minimum of 10- 14 % of the total area which is subject to the rules of catch crops (Ministry of 
Food, Agriculture and Fisheries 4 2010, pp.34-35).   
 
Riparian strips  
A subsidy for riparian strips exists and in order to apply the nearby lake or open stream has to 
be larger than 100 m
2 
(Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries 3 2010, p.19,). The 
riparian strip has to be at least 10 meters wide but not wider than 20 meter. The used area may 
not be used for production or grazing. The subsidy for establishing fallow riparian strips 2010 
are 160€/ha 
 
6.2.1.2 Germany 
The federal and state level jointly arranges subsidies for agricultural and coastal preservation 
(Gemeinschaftaufgabe der Agrarstruktur- und Küstenschutzes, GAK stands for a substantial 
part of the payments (www, Ministerium für Landwirtschaft, Umwelt und ländliche Räume 1 
2011).The funds are intended to provide support to investments in the agricultural sector, but 
also to support farms in the less favored areas (LFA) and to encourage environmental 
protection. 
 
The German landscape is rather variable in terms of population density and size of farms, but 
the economic conditions are also different in former East- and West- Germany (www, Europa 
2007). Due to the fact that Germany has a federal structure the rural development policy 
implemented at regional level by 14 regions arranged according to the 16 “Bundesländer” 
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were Berlin-Brandenbrug and Niedersachsen/Bremen present joint programs. This study 
focuses on the rural development programs of Schleswig-Holstein.  
 
Support to improve environment and nature  
In order to be eligible for support aiming to improve environment and landscape farmers have 
to make a commitment lasting for five years (Landwirtschaftskammer Schleswig-Holstein 1 
2010).  
 
Support for reducing nitrogen leaching 
Areas which are located inside the area protected by the water framework directive of 
Schleswig-Holstein are eligible for payments for growing catch crops 
(Landwirtschaftskammer Schleswig-Holstein 1 2010). The subsidy for catch crop for 
conventional farmers amounted to 125 €/ha in 2010. The subsidy for catch crops on an 
organic farm amounted to 80 €/ha in 2010. In 2011 will these measures become mandatory at 
certain fields which are sensitive to erosion, but no subsidies will be available (Pers. com., 
Thomsen 2011). 
 
Support for buffer strips  
The applicant is committing to maintain buffer strips along fixed borders of the field in order 
to receive this kind of payment (www, Ministerum für Landwirtschaft, Umwelt und ländliche 
Räume des Landes Schleswig-Holstein 2, 2010, p.24). The buffer strip should be between 6 
and 24 meters wide and exist during five years along surface water, close to buildings or 
roads. The buffer strip must be located in the same area during this period. All acts except 
those who aim to support maintenance of the buffer strip are forbidden. The payment for 
buffer strips in 2010 were 600 €/ha. In 2011 will these measures become mandatory for 
everyone that farms fields close to open water. However all farmers will be compensated 
(Pers. com., Thomsen 2011).  
 
Improved N-utilization from liquid manure.  
Support for spreading of liquid manure from the farm using slurry tankers with trailing shoes, 
trailing hose or shallow slurry spreading systems is available (www, Ministerum für 
Landwirtschaft, Umwelt und ländliche Räume des Landes Schleswig-Holstein 2, 2010, p.24). 
If the work is conducted by contractor a document which confirms date of spreading, the 
quantity of manure and the proceeding of the actions are required. The subsidy is based on a 
reference area which receives a payment of 30 Euro. The reference area is calculated: 
(livestock unit * 0,5ha). 
 
Livestock units are calculated depending on the type of animal. Young cattle age less than one 
year represents 0,3 LU, one till two years 0,7 LU (www, Proplanta 2011). Bulls used for 
breeding and steers represent 1,2 LU. Cows, heifers and fattening animals are considered as 
one LU. From 2011 is this subsidy no longer available (Pers. com., Thomsen 2011).  
 
Natura 2000 –premium 
Farms that have minimum 2 hectares of land within “Natura 2000” areas or other protected 
areas can apply for this kind of subsidy (Landwirtschaftskammer Schleswig-Holstein 1 2010). 
It is required that you have grassland on the farm. When renewing forage you are not allowed 
to practice deep cultivation like plowing etc. If drainage is added to the field it must be done 
in a manner that doesn’t change the dewatering effect. Measures that aim to maintain trenches 
and drainage are allowed. The subsidy amounts to 80 Euro/ha and year. Areas selected as 
bird sanctuary where special birds occur may be eligible for a subsidy up to 150 Euro/ha.  
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Permanent grassland program (Dauergrünland-Programm) 
This program is intended to support farms dominated by grassland (Permanent grassland 
minimum 2/3 of arable land) (Landwirtschaftskammer Schleswig-Holstein 1 2010). The 
program is nationwide with the exception for small islands in the North sea.  
 
Protection by species promoted by choice is used to protect ground nesting birds and 
amphibians in springtime. From 1 of April until 15 of May cultivation, spread of manure and 
the spreading of chemical plant protection substances are prohibited. If ground nest birds or 
amphibians still stay on the field the period could be prolonged until 31 of May. The subsidies 
amount a payment of 35 Euro/ha per year. This amount could be added to the Natura 2000-
premium and subsidies for use of organic farming methods. The commitment period lasts for 
five years. 
 
Contractual nature conservation (Vertragsnaturschutz) 
Land managed by farmers or other land managers like authorities in areas that are subject to 
the Natura 2000-premium, other Natural protected areas or areas with similar conditions that 
for example contain areas with special amphibians and ground birds nest 
(Landwirtschaftskammer Schleswig-Holstein 1 2010) .  
 
The land should be managed according to special rules protecting species and biotopes. The 
payment amounts to between 60 and 650 Euro/ha and might be combined with the “Natura 
2000-premium”, see appendix 4. The period of commitment lasts for five years. 
 
6.2.1.3 Sweden 
There are several Agri-environmental measures and they are all based on five year 
commitments.  
 
Riparian strips 
A subsidy for riparian strips adjacent to water exists. The riparian strip has to be at least 6 
meter wide but not exceed 20 meters width (www, Jordbruksverket, 4 2011). The area 
adjacent to water has to be at least 20 meters long. The farmer is allowed to harvest the grass 
on the riparian strip but not before July 15
th
.  The support level for establishing a riparian strip 
amounted to 314 €/ha in 2010.  
 
Reduced nitrogen leaching  
In areas where the nitrogen leaching is considered high there are possibilities to receive 
subsidies for measures that reduce nitrogen leaching, see Table 27 (www, Jordbruksverket, 5 
2011). There are two ways to gain this subsidy. One is to grow catch crops on at least 20 per 
cent of the tillable area planted by spring crop. The other method is through spring cultivation 
of a minimum of 20 per cent of the area planted by spring crops.  
 
Table 27. Payment per hectare for reduced nitrogen leaching in Sweden  
Measure / Year 2010 
Catch crop 94 €/ha 
Spring cultivation 52 €/ha 
Spring cultivation and spring crop 
on the same land 
    157€/ha 
 
Source: (www, Jordbruksverket, 5 2011)  
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Grassland 
Tillable land that is used for grassland is subject to a subsidy (vallstöd), see Table 28. The 
grassland can be harvested or grazed but has to remain uncultivated for at least three winters 
in a row to be eligible for the subsidy (www, Jordbruksverket, 6 2011). In support areas 1-5 it 
is possible to receive a supplementary payment if there is a certain number of LU per hectare 
in production. 
 
Table 28. Payments per hectare for grassland and supplements in Sweden  
Support Area 2010 
Basic payment in support area 1-5 32 €/ha 
Basic payment in support area 9 52 €/ha 
Supplementary payments    
Support area 1-3 210 €/ha  
Support area 4 94 €/ha 
Support area 5a and 5b 47 €/ha 
Support area 5c and 5m 63 €/ha 
Source: (www, Jordbruksverket, 6 2011)  
 
Semi-natural pastures and mown meadows 
Additional subsidies for permanent pasture land are also available, see Table 29. Depending 
on the type of pasture land different subsidies are available depending on if the land is grazed 
or harvested by use of certain methods designed to maintain biodiversity (www, 
Jordbruksverket, 7 2011). The subsidies can be divided into land with general values and land 
with particular values. Land with general values is defined as land which is grazed and is 
suited for grazing. The land is not appropriate for plowing. Mown meadows should be 
harvested each year and the land cannot be forestland. Land with particular values is 
determined by the County Administrative Board and can include land which in addition to the 
general values also may include rules that govern: when to graze or harvest, restrictions 
against supplement feeding, rules regarding vegetation and specific cultural values.  
 
Table 29 Payments per hectare for pasture land in Sweden 
Measure / Year 2010 
Grazed land with general values 131 €/ha 
Grazed land with particular values 278 €/ha 
  
Mown meadow with general values 152 €/ha 
Mown meadow with particular values 440 €/ha 
Source: (www, Jordbruksverket, 7 2011)  
 
 
6.2.2 Less favored areas 
6.2.2.1 Denmark 
In addition to the environmental subsidies a subsidy for less favored areas exist. This subsidy 
may be is combined with the environmental subsidies and applies to farmers located on small 
islands (Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries 5 2010, p.38). Since the subsidy is 
combined with the environmental subsidies the commitments extend for a period over five 
years (Council Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005) and the farmer has to have a minimum of 5 
hectares of land. The subsidy for farmers on islands were in 2010 64€/ha.  
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6.2.2.2 Germany (Förderung landwirtschaftlicher Betriebe in benachteiligten Gebieten) 
Farms with a minimum of 3 hectares of eligible agricultural land on the islands without 
connection to mainland are eligible for this subsidy. Payments are not fulfilled if the applicant 
for example has off-farm income in excess of 40 000 Euro if the farmer is married, if not 
married, 30 000 Euro. The level of the subsidy in 2010 was 117 €/ha for grassland and 58 
€/ha for arable land. The maximum payment is 10 000 Euro. In addition special payments are 
available for farmers on the small islands in the North Sea who keep cattle, sheep or horses.  
 
Germany has 19,1 million hectares of utilized agricultural land, about 5 % of them are 
classified as less-favored areas (www, Europa 2007).  
 
6.2.2.3 Sweden 
The LFA-support in Sweden is complemented by national support (Jordbruksdepartementet 
2010). The aim of the subsidies is to support less favored areas and to ensure that production 
is maintained in the areas. The value of the subsidies varies depending on area, see Table 30. 
The subsidy in table 31 is given to grazed and permanent pasture land, tillable land and also 
the dairy production. The LFA-support, as part of the Rural Development Program, is 
financed by both EU (46,7 %) and the Swedish government (53,3 %). The national support is 
financed entirely by the Swedish government. Other subsides are available but has been 
disregarded due to having no relation to dairy production.  
 
Table 30 Subsidies available for less favored areas in Sweden  
Subsidy areas F 1 2a 2b 3 4a 4b 5a 5b 
Grassland and pastureland €/ha                 
0-90 ha 283 283 283 283 283 283 115 157 94 
above 90 ha 141 141 1350 1350 1050 1050 58 79 47 
Grain €/ha                   
0-90 ha 105 105 105 105 105 52 - - - 
above 90 ha 52 52 52 52 52 26 - - - 
Milk production €/kg - 0,14 0,08 0,07 0,02 - - - - 
Source:(www, Jordbruksverket, 8 2011)  
 
6.2.3 Investment subsidies 
6.2.3.1 Denmark 
The budget for investment subsidies (in axis 1) in the Danish Rural Development is slightly 
above 800 million Euros (www, The Danish Food Industry Agency 3 2011). Other subsidies 
within the program aim to support investments in new technology for sustainable 
environmental development such as renewable energy, recycling of heat in barns (Pers com. 
Korning 2011). 
 
The payment level of the subsidy varies depending upon which area the investment takes 
place such as renewable energy or business development (www, The Danish Food Industry 
Agency 4 2011). The maximum payment level is 40 per cent of the investment. However, for 
most investments a minimum investment of 40 000 Euros is required in order to apply. The 
maximum payment a recipient can receive is approximately 265 000 Euros, thus 40 per cent 
of 670 000 Euros. 
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6.2.3.2 Germany 
Schleswig-Holsteins Rural Development Program aims to support a sustainable and 
competitive agricultural sector (www, Ministerium für Landwirtschaft, Umwelt und ländliche 
Räume, 2 2011). The program supports a wide variety of investments and the main share is 
investments to improve competitiveness, environmental improvements and diversification of 
agricultural businesses. 
 
Subsidies for investments targeted to the development of farm businesses can be granted for 
constructing new buildings, storage or greenhouses (www, Ministerium für Landwirtschaft, 
Umwelt und ländliche Räume, 3 2011). The investment cost however has to be a minimum of 
175 000 Euros, and may not exceed 500 000 Euros in order to be eligible for support. If these 
requirements are met the subsidy can be granted in form of a lump-sum payment of 25 000 
Euros. The subsidy however can only be received once per recipient during the period of 
2007-2013. 
 
Schleswig-Holstein has decided to ensure the competitiveness for dairy farmers in the region 
(ibid.). Therefore an investment subsidy for the expansion of new dairy barns and the 
expansion of existing barns is available. If the investment cost is a minimum of 120 000 
Euros and does not exceed 600 000 Euros a recipient may receive a subsidy of 30 000 Euros. 
 
6.2.3.3 Sweden 
In Sweden the Rural Development Program aims to support the development of various 
agribusinesses, to increase the quality of production, adjust to new conditions, enhance the 
competitiveness, and to ensure environmental and animal welfare improvements 
(Jordbruksdepartementet 2010). The rural development program contains several investment 
subsidies. Currently there is an extra focus on supporting investments that are related to 
reduce environmental effects. Other areas that the program focuses on are improved energy 
efficiency and production of renewable energy. There are also funds available for farmers 
who are modernizing their dairy production. 
 
The maximum amount a recipient normally can receive is 30 per cent of the investment 
(ibid.). However, in some sparsely populated areas in the northern part of Sweden can the 
amount be up to 50 per cent of the total investment. The maximum payment an applicant can 
receive varies depend on the region. In Hallands region the subsidy is circa 75 000 Euro 
(Länsstyrelsen Halland 2008, p.12). In Scania the subsidy is around 155 000 Euros and 
investments within dairy or renewable energy can receive an additional 50 000 Euros 
(Länsstyrelsen Skåne 2011). In Västergötlands region the maximum amount is circa 210 000 
Euro and if the investment involved several applicants the amount could be doubled but not 
exceeding 30 per cent of the total investment (Länsstyrelsen Västra Götaland 2011) 
 
6.3 Emergency aid  
During 2009 the dairy sector in Europe was in a financial crisis. As a result of this the 
European Commission decided to grant an additional aid package to improve the financial 
situation of dairy producers’ (www, Jordbruksverket 2, 2010). The total size of the aid 
package was 280 million Euros and the farmers had to receive the money before the end of 
June 2010. The size of the payment each country received was based on the national quota. 
How the money was to be distributed within each country was decided on a national level. 
The values in this section have been recalculated to Euro according to exchange rates in 
Appendix 1. 
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6.3.1 Denmark 
The emergency aid in Denmark was divided depending on the individual quota which the 
farmer owned. The payment in Denmark was 2,01 Euro per ton of quota the farmer owned 1
st
 
of January 2010 (Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries 6, 2010). In order to be a 
recipient the farmer had to have delivered milk during the period from 1
st
 of April 2009 – 31st 
of December 2009. The total grant Denmark received amounted to 9,86 million Euros.  
 
6.3.2 Germany 
The emergency aid in Germany was based divided across all grassland (Pers com. Möllgaard 
2011). For each hectare of grassland the farmer received 20 Euros. The total grant Germany 
received amounted to 61,2 million Euros. 
 
In addition to the emergency aid Germany provided two national subsidies which are 
complementary to the European emergency aid (ibid.). The aim of both subsidies was to 
improve the dairy farmers’ financial situation. The first subsidy was also based on grassland 
and was financed from both EU and Germany. The payment was 38 Euro per hectare and is 
available during 2010 and 2011. 
 
The second national subsidy is a payment is a cow-payment. This payment is based on the 
number of cows the farmer has. The payment is 21 Euros per cow and is available during 
2010 and 2011 (ibid.).   
 
6.3.3 Sweden 
The emergency aid in Sweden was divided depending on the amount of milk delivered during 
the period from 1
st
 of April 2008 – 31st of March 2009 (www, Jordbruksverket 2, 2010). The 
farmers received 2,35 Euros per delivered ton milk. The total grant Sweden received 
amounted to 6,43 million Euros. 
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7. Case farm data 
From the data given by the IFCN, see method, were a case farm and a farm plan designed. 
Some data which was needed for the farm was not included in the material provided by the 
IFCN typical farm. The missing data was supplemented with help from data found in the farm 
planning program of the Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences (Agriwise, 2011).  
 
The IFCN farm data used consist of values from 2009. Prices for production inputs are taken 
from Agriwise and are referred to October-September in 2010 (www, Agriwise, 2, 2011). The 
values obtained from the above mentioned sources were introduced into a farm plan in order 
to create a model to which the agriculture policies can be evaluated based upon equation (26) 
and (31). 
 
7.1 Description of the case farm 
The case farm used in this study has 220 dairy cows with 205 hectares of agricultural land and 
is located close to the south west coast of Sweden. 
  
7.1.1 Milk production 
The dairy herd has a recruitment percentage of 37% which implies that 81,4 dairy cows has to 
be replaced every year. In the farm plan 81,4 heifers are kept to replace dairy cows while the 
rest of the calves are sold. The average yield per cow in the case farm is 9873 kg ECM milk. 
It should be noticed that IFCN calculates ECM: 4,0 % fat and 3,3 % protein, while Sweden 
use: 4,2 % and 3,4 %. The total amount of milk sold at the market is 2103 tons in year 2009 
according to data from the IFCN farm. All milk produced is not sold at the market and 
therefore is the amount sold per cow in the farm plan adjusted to 9559 kg ECM. Some milk is 
used for feeding of the calves. 
 
7.1.1 Crop production for feed demand 
To depict the case farm a crop rotation plan and a balance of feed consumption was created. 
The data acquired from the IFCN includes data about the crops grown at the farm and also 
feed consumption per dairy cow per day. The data describing which crops are cultivated and 
to what extent, are displayed in Table 31. A yield of 5 ton/hectare is obtained for grain grown 
on the farm. The yield of forage is based on a system using three or four harvests. The case 
farm is based on three harvests where the total amount of forage is estimated to about 9,5 tons 
dry matter independent of the number of harvests. The yield of corn silage is estimated to 11,5 
tons per hectare and for barley silage 6,5 tons. The yields might be considered as normal for a 
conventional farm in this region of Sweden. The forage is grown for three years and then 
renewed by reseeding in barley. The second year the barley is harvested as silage. Ten 
hectares of arable land are used for the cows during summer time because the farm is forced 
to let the cows graze during summer. 
 
The permanent grassland is estimated to produce 2500 kg dry matter per hectare and amounts 
55 hectares. There are two type of permanent pasture at the farm, 35 hectares are not fertilized 
while the remaining 20 hectares are. All land is classified as permanent pasture in the study, 
thus the land is considered to have payment entitlements for permanent pasture.  
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Table 31 Crop rotation at case farm 
Crop rotaion Area (ha) 
Yield 
(kg) TOTAL 
Forage I-III 60,0 9,5 570 
Barley 28,0 5 140 
Barley silage 20,0 6,5 130,0 
Corn 32,0 11,5 368 
Pasture (paddock) 10,0 0 0 
Permanent pasture 20 2,5 50 
Semi-natural pasture  35 2,5 88 
TOTAL 205,0 
  Source: (Own arrangement)  
 
   7.2 Feed consumption 
The crops grown on the case farm are adjusted in order to satisfy feed consumption of the 
dairy cows. The cows are fed with grass/corn silage, grain, concentrates, straw and some 
minerals. The heifers are fed with grass/barley, straw, minerals but also feed from the 
pastures. The farm produces most of the feed except from about 375 tons of concentrate 
(mainly grain) which is purchased for feeding the dairy cows. For more information see 
appendix 2 
 
7.3 Application of Model to case farm 
The fact that the case farm is Swedish causes some difficulties when applying the Danish and 
German system. To validate the reliability of this study interviews with experts in the field 
were performed, see chapter 3, section 3.10. The interviewees provided information about 
how farmers apply for subsidies and to which extent they are used. The conditions for farming 
vary between the countries which makes the comparison more difficult. The crop rotation 
which is used at the case farm is adapted to the climate and agricultural policy system in the 
south west of Sweden where the farm is located. By keeping the crop rotation constant when 
applying the Danish and German system the economic effects due to changes in crops and 
crop rotation are disregarded. For example the ratio of forage at the case farm might be an 
effect of the Swedish subsidy for growing forage during a period of three years at the same 
field. The 55 hectares of pasture consist of 35 hectares semi-natural pastures which are a 
common type of agricultural land in Sweden but not in Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein.  
 
The data from IFCN describes which subsidies the case farm apply for which gives some 
guidelines about how the Danish and German subsidy system could be applied on the case 
farm. For example some subsidies that the farm may have possibility to apply for are not 
applied. The same reasoning was common among farmers visited and interwied in Denmark 
and Germany. 
 
 7.3.1 Denmark 
The Danish dairy farmers do not apply for agri-environmental subsidies to the same extent as 
the case farm of this study given that the Swedish system is applied. According to (Pers com. 
Korning, 2011) these possibilities are not given due to the fact that the agricultural landscape 
is different. Another reason is that Danish dairy farmers often have large herds and need all 
land to produce feed for the animals. The stock density is often high at the Danish dairy 
farms. The regulations allow maximum 1,7 LU/ha to reduce the environmental effects such as 
nitrogen leaching. But if a farmer makes sure that s/he grows permanent grass or similar at 70 
64 
 
% of the total agricultural area, their stock density could be increased to 2,4 LU/ha. The 
environmental subsidies require certain measures that decrease the crop yield, which for a 
dairy farmer is it mostly uneconomical. But if a farmer has land that is impossible to plough, 
like the semi-natural pasture of the case farm, s/he would probably apply for environmental 
measures.  
 
The case farm uses about 50 per cent of the arable land to grow grass for silage and pasture. If 
the case farm would be located in Denmark it would probably grow a larger share grass which 
would make it possible to increase the number of dairy cows.  
 
7.3.2 Germany 
The farmers of Schleswig-Holstein usually do not apply for agri-environmental subsidies 
(Pers. com., Thomsen, 2011). In other regions of Germany these kinds of payments are much 
more important for the dairy production. The increasing rules for cross-compliance make 
farmers thinking of disclaiming subsidies due to the risk of potential reductions of payments 
and their cupping effect on land productivity, facing on the other hand increasing land costs 
(Pers. com., Hagemann 2011). 
 
The funds for the 2
nd
 pillar measures have decreased in Schleswig-Holstein as an effect of the 
financial crisis (Pers. com., Thomsen, 2011). Instead of paying farmers to implement 
measures that improve agriculture in a more sustainable direction the authorities instead tend 
to change the legislation to force measures into effect. 
 
Schleswig-Holstein is at the moment in the middle of a “biogas boom” (ibid.) A lot of biogas 
plants are constructed in the area which cause an increased demand for bio material and then 
mainly corn silage. The biogas plants together with solar panels are a result of German 
policies aiming to increase sustainable production of electricity. The measures are favorable 
to farmers because they have buildings to put solar panels on and material to use in a biogas 
plant. These policies largely affect the dairy sector of Schleswig-Holstein. The biogas plants 
compete with dairy production in order to use the land for production of corn/grass silage. A 
large share of the agricultural land in Schleswig-Holstein is therefore used for production of 
corn silage. The large share of land used for one crop causes problems which the authorities 
try to handle by applying new measures and policies.  
 
The case farm in this study grows a larger share of forage compared to corn. If the case farm 
would be located in Schleswig-Holstein the farmer would probably grow as much corn as 
possible due to high demand for corn silage. In most cases corn is preferred to all other crops. 
The only limit is the German legislation that prohibits farmers to plough permanent grassland 
and use for other crops. The case farm is not growing corn in all arable land due to the fixed 
values of the model. The areas used for different crops remain unchanged regardless of which 
is most profitable.  
 
7.3.3. Sweden 
Since the data for the case farm is based on data from Swedish farms is it possible to examine 
a typical farm in a certain region of Sweden, which kind of subsidies are applied and which 
kind of crops are grown. Many effects of the Swedish policies may be illustrated through the 
structure of the farm operation. 
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8. Analysis with policies of the countries 
This section consists of a comparison of the policies of Denmark, Germany and Sweden 
applied at the farm model. The three policies applied in the comparison are: 
 
Danish policy: The whole country has two levels of payment; one for arable land and one 
other for pasture land. Denmark is the country with the most similar conditions and least 
variation. 
 
German policy: Schleswig-Holstein has been chosen as focus for this study due to the fact 
that it is the “Bundesland” which is closest to Denmark and Sweden.  Schleswig-Holstein has 
comparable conditions in terms of climate and soil type, especially to Denmark. 
 
Swedish policy: Region 3 has been chosen due to the fact that the agricultural conditions in 
this region are close to the other two countries. In addition, a realistic farm model was 
developed for that region with a lot of useful data to facilitate a comparison between the 
countries.   
 
8.1 Single Payment  
A comparison of the competiveness between Denmark, Germany and Sweden results in some 
difficulties. The countries have different soil and climate conditions which are reflected in the 
crop yields. This is important to mention even though the single payment scheme is almost 
totally decoupled from production in all three countries. Nevertheless the payment is to a 
large extent based on historical production. The magnitude of the payment in the former area 
aid scheme was based on income from crops sold. Intervention prices for agricultural 
commodities combined with crop yields formed the basis for the payment. By connecting the 
payment as an entitlement to land EU wanted to suppress a production system that caused a 
large surplus. Regions with good soils and climate received higher payments due to high 
yields of grain. The payment worked as compensation related to lower intervention prices. 
Farmers who receive high yields of grain would otherwise face a proportionally larger loss in 
terms of income. The fact that the three countries are not entirely equal yields different values 
to the single payment caused by the various climate and soil conditions.  
 
An analysis of the single payment scheme, subsidy by subsidy, reveals how they affect the 
average cost of delivered milk at the case farm. The values in Table 32 and Table 33 are based 
on the case farm with 150 hectares of arable land and 55 hectares of permanent grassland. The 
case farm in the study is located in Falkenberg in the south west of Sweden which belongs to 
region 3 according to the Swedish system for single payments. The basic level of payment in 
this region is 203 Euros per hectare for arable land and 126 Euros per hectare for permanent 
pasture. Table 32 displays the payment for arable land applying the policies of the three 
countries on the case farm. Table 33 displays the payment for permanent grassland. The 
German system yields the highest value for arable land while Sweden yields the lowest. When 
payments for permanent grassland are compared it is revealed that Germany has the lowest 
and Denmark the highest payment. If the average payment per hectare of total land, arable 
land and permanent grassland land, is calculated another picture emerges. Denmark receives 
the highest value, 291 Euro per hectare, Germany receives 209 Euro per hectare and Sweden 
164 Euro per hectare.  
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Table 32. Value of single payment related to arable land, before modulation 
 Arable land on the farm (150 ha) Euro/ha 
Total 
payment 
Decrease of average cost/delivered 
ton milk 
Denmark 299,13 44870                21,34     
Germany 310,03 46505                22,11     
Sweden 202,87 30431                14,47     
Source: (Own arrangement)  
 
Table 33. Value of single payment related to permanent grassland, before modulation 
 Permanent grassland on the farm 
(55 ha) Euro/ha 
Total 
payment 
Decrease of average cost/delivered 
ton milk 
Denmark 282,40 15532                   7,39     
Germany 107,70 5924                   2,82     
Sweden 125,63 6910                   3,29     
Source: (Own arrangement)  
 
8.2 Supplement entitlements  
A supplement is added to the payment of arable land and permanent grassland. This 
supplement is related to historical production and is calculated differently depending on how 
each country implemented the CAP reform. To facilitate the analysis and calculations of the 
supplementary entitlements of the case farm in this study is set as a constant which has not 
changed since the year 2000. Year 2000 until 2002 were the years when the reference period 
that determined the magnitude of the supplement entitlements for Denmark, Germany and 
Sweden.  
 
8.2.1 Livestock premiums 
The case farm has never raised bulls or steers during the reference period and therefore the 
farm has not qualified for the male bovine premium. Nor was the farm qualified to receive the 
extensification premium since the density of animal was too high compared to the access to 
land. The rules set at maximum of 1,4 livestock units (LU) per hectare (www, European 
Commision 2 2002). The area of land at the case farm is 205 hectares which means that it can 
bear 287 LU which is less than the actual stock.  
 
Table 34 displays the payments relating to the former slaughter premium and how much value 
it adds to the production of one ton milk. Since Germany did chose to include the slaughter 
premium along with the extensification premium into the regional premium for permanent 
grassland the individual farmer will not benefit from historical production. These payments 
will be shared equally between all the areas of permanent grassland in the region. 
 
Denmark and Sweden chose to provide individual entitlements to each farmer related to their 
historical production. Denmark decided to reduce these entitlements from 2009 as a step 
against total decoupling of the system (Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries 1 2010, 
p.29). This means that the farmers in 2010, which is the year investigated in this study, will 
receive their entitlements for historical slaughter premiums between 2000 and 2002 although 
reduced by about 28 %. The payment entitlements displayed the same values between 2005 
and 2008, but due to the Danish modulation the differences increase until the year of 2012. In 
2012 the Danish payments will be about 56 % lower per ton of delivered milk compared to 
the Swedish.  
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This means that by comparison the slaughter premium the Swedish system gives the largest 
reduction of average costs per ton delivered milk due to the fact that payments from historical 
slaughter premiums maintain the original individual value.   
 
Table 34.Value of single payment related to slaughter premium during reference period 2000-2002, before 
modulation 
 Average slaughtered animal 
2000-2002 on the farm (71,3) Euro/animal 
Total 
premium 
Decrease of average  
cost/delivered ton milk 
Denmark 57,50 4 100                   1,95     
Germany 0,00 0                       -       
Sweden 80,00 5 704                   2,09     
Source: (Own arrangement)  
 
8.3 Milk Premium 
The milk premium that was introduced in 2005 has a large impact on the value of the SPS in 
all three countries. The payment which was transferred to special payment entitlements varies 
depending on the amount of quota the farmer owned at the time the premium was decoupled. 
The case farm has a total quota of 2200 tons which has been the basis for the calculation of 
the payment.  
 
In Denmark in 2006 the milk premium became decoupled and transferred to special payment 
entitlement. The payment per kilo of quota amounted 0,0259 Euro. When applied to the case 
farm the total value transferred to special payment entitlements is 56 980 Euro, see Table 35. 
Germany is the country with the highest milk premium. When the milk premium was 
decoupled in 2006 the payment amounted to 0,0355 Euro per kilo of quota. However, in 2010 
as a affect of the regional model which Germany will apply the payment was reduced by 10 
per cent. The total payment with the German system is 70 290 Euro. Sweden was the last 
country among the three countries to decouple the milk premium but also the country with the 
lowest payment. The payment is Sweden is 0,0227 Euro per kilo of quota. When the Swedish 
system is applied the value of the payment is 49 940 Euro. 
 
Due to the fact that the milk premium is decoupled it is not directly related to dairy 
production in its current form. If a farmer exits dairy production he or she would still receive 
the payment. However the short term economic effect of the payment for a dairy producer is 
substantial and when the German system is applied the average cost decreases by 33,42 Euro 
per ton of delivered milk. When the Danish system is applied, which has the second highest 
payment, the average cost decreases with 27,09 Euro per ton of delivered milk. Sweden is the 
country with the lowest payment. The average cost for the case farm decreases by 23,75 Euro 
per delivered ton milk due to the milk premium.  
 
Table 35. Value of milk premium transferred to SPS 
Total quota on the farm 
(2200 tons) Euro/kg 
Total 
premium 
Decrease of average 
 cost/delivered ton milk 
Denmark 0,0259 56 980 27,09 
Germany 0,0320 70 290 33,42 
Sweden 0,0227 49 940 23,75 
Source: (Own arrangement)  
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The milk premium is associated with large economic values for the producers. However, the 
payment is based on historical production during a reference period and it is given to farmers 
who have been dairy producers for some time. If a farmer enters dairy farming he or she will 
not receive the same reimbursement. The same effect occurs if a farmer wants to expand an 
existing dairy herd. The payment would not increase. Therefore, expansion of dairy 
production may be inhibited due to not receiving the same payments as other dairy producers.  
 
8.4 Implications of the single payment scheme 
The total single payment entitlements including the individual entitlements of the case farm 
when the three policies are applied are calculated in Table 36. The calculations reveal that the 
different systems affect the case farm quite differently and they have a substantial influence 
on the cost per ton delivered milk. The fact that the three countries decouple the subsidy 
system in different ways causes some different effects in terms of competitiveness during the 
period 2005-2013. Both Germany and Denmark started a modulation of the individual 
entitlements in 2009 lasting till 2013.  
 
Germany chose to decouple all payments directly in 2005 and began to modulate all 
individual entitlements related to historical production from 2009. Denmark used a different 
method and kept 75 % of the male bovine premium in the same way as Sweden, but from 
2009 they started to modulate the premiums while Sweden kept them at the same level until 
2012. The first deduction of 25 % is added as a supplementary entitlement to the individual 
payments. 
 
 Denmark and Sweden has continued to pay extensification premiums and slaughter 
premiums to farmers which received these payments during the reference period 2000-2002, 
as individual entitlements.  Germany chose another way by including these two payments into 
the payments for permanent grassland and distributed them equally to all area within the 
region. This means that all farmers in each German region receive a share of the slaughter and 
extensification premiums. 
 
Table 36. Total single payment entitlement in Euro 
Single payments 2010 DK DE SE 
Arable Land (150) 44 870 46 505 30 431 
Permanent pasture (55) 15 532 5 924 6 910 
Slaughter premium (71,3) 4 100 0 5 704 
Milkpremium (2200) 56 980 70 290 49 940 
Total 121 480  122 718   92 983   
After modulation 8% 112 162   113 301   85 944   
Decrease of average cost/ton delivered 
milk 53,33 53,88 40,87 
Source: (Own arrangement)  
 
 
8.5 Agri-environmental measures 
A comparison of the environmental subsidies in the three countries causes some difficulties 
due to the fact that the rules are rather different. In some areas the countries force 
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environmental measures by legislation and in other cases motivation is achieved by subsidies 
or tax reliefs.  
 
In this section subsidies that have a similar purpose and comply with similar rules are 
compared to each other. The comparison starts with the subsidies that have the most 
similarities with each other. These are considered as most important for the study by 
calculating an effect which in relative terms is easier to measure and use for comparisons. 
There are a lot of different measures with environmental objectives as well as in the areas of 
rural development.  
 
8.8.1 Reduced nitrogen leaching 
The first environmental subsidy compared in Table 37 is subsidies for catch crops. Germany 
and Sweden motivate the use of catch crops by subsidies while Denmark applies a legislative 
system which requires catch crops and winter cover crops, see 6.1.2. All three countries have 
legislation that stipulates a minimum area covered by crops during winter.  
 
The fact that all Danish farmers have to arrange a balance sheet for their nitrogen application, 
in this study referred to as nitrogen account, is an important issue to discuss. The nitrogen 
account helps the farmer to optimize the nitrogen ratio for each crop which could reduce 
costs. But it could also lead to higher costs due to the fact that the system may force a 
suboptimal us of nitrogen.   
 
The subsidy in Sweden is divided into two parts which makes it possible to just partly 
participate in the program for reducing nitrogen leaching. Separately these subsidies amount 
to 94 euro per hectare and 52 euro per hectare. The higher level applies to catch crops and the 
other refers to spring cultivation. If both methods are combined the farmer receives a slightly 
higher payment, 157 Euros.  
 
Germany has one subsidy for catch crops which requires that land remains green during 
winter which means using both catch crop and spring cultivation. The crop rotation used by 
the case farm in this study will not be affected of this difference. Corn is the only crop that 
could be followed by a catch crop due to the fact that the barley which is grown is followed 
by reseeding forage in the same year.  
 
Table 37. Value of subsidies for reduced nitrogen leaching 
Hectares for catch crop on 
the farm (corn 32ha) Euro/ha 
Total 
premium 
Decrease of average cost/delivered ton 
milk 
Denmark 0,00 0   
Germany 125,00 4000        1,90     
Sweden 52-->157 5024        2,39     
Source: (Own arrangement)  
 
Germany has a special subsidy that encourages improvement of techniques for spreading of 
manure at the farm. Denmark and Sweden do not have this type of subsidy. They regulate the 
issue by legislation, advisory services and other policies. The level of payment depends on the 
number of livestock units (LU) which at the case farm is 301,4 LU. According to Table 38 
this gives the farm a payment of 4 521 Euro.  
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Table 38. Value of subsidies for improved N-utilization  
 Reference area LU*0,5ha 
(150,7 ha) Euro/ha 
Total 
premium 
Decrease of average cost/delivered ton 
milk 
Denmark 0,00 0   
Germany 30,00 4521        2,15     
Sweden 0,00 0             -       
Source: (Own arrangement)  
 
8.5.1 Subsidies for grassland & forage on arable land 
An analysis of the environmental subsidies for grassland shows that they are constructed in a 
different manner in the three countries. This study does not measure the differences in costs 
implementing the different rules for grassland. In Sweden grassland is often used in the 
ordinary crop rotation while German farmers often have two separate crop rotations. Some 
fields are used for growing corn and barley while some are permanent grassland. These 
subsidies are to a large extent related to the land structure which causes some difficulties for a 
comparison due to the fact that a Swedish farm is used as a basis. 
 
In this study is the farm expected to use the same crop rotations and crops independently of 
the applied policy. A crop rotation containing three years of forage followed by one year 
barley is suitable in a Swedish system. Without a subsidy that implies growing of forage for 
continuous three years, could a more suitable crop rotation be two years of forage. But due to 
the fact that consumption of feed are constant, a large amount of forage has to be part of the 
crop rotation to maintain high yields and to secure the supply of high quality feed. The feed 
ration and quality affects the milk yield which is also assumed to be fixed. Due to the fixed 
values in the model, the possibilities to implement environmental subsidies in different ways 
and thereby maximizing profit according to the design of environmental subsidies not 
possible. 
 
Table 39. Value of payment for growing forage 
 Forage on arable land  
(60 ha) Euro/ha 
Total 
premium 
Decrease of average cost/delivered ton 
milk 
Denmark - - - 
Germany - - - 
Sweden 79,00 4740 2,25 
Source: (Own arrangement)  
 
An analysis of the payments for permanent grassland indicates that all countries have 
subsidies within this area. The comparison assumes that the 35 hectares of permanent 
grassland may be adapted to the regulation in each country without affecting the costs of the 
farm or yields of the grassland. Table 40 shows that Denmark and Germany support the use of 
permanent grassland to a larger extent than Sweden. The Danish and Swedish systems result 
in a larger decrease of average cost per delivered ton milk.  
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Table 40. Value of payment for permanent grassland 
Permanent grassland (35 ha) Euro/ha 
Total 
premium 
Decrease of average cost/delivered ton 
milk 
Denmark 188,00 6580        3,13     
Germany 280,00 9800        4,66     
Sweden 131,00 4585        2,18    
Source: (Own arrangement)  
 
The farm is located in an area labeled 5a, see appendix 5, which in Sweden is classified as a 
less favored area. In the comparison it is assumed that the farm has 115 hectares of grassland 
which is eligible for compensation see Table 41. This compensation is not available when the 
Danish or German system is applied both countries only will have LFA subsidies on islands. 
The reimbursement has a large effect in the Swedish system and decreases the average cost 
per delivered ton milk with 7,66 Euro.  
 
Table 41, Value of compensation for less favored areas on grassland 
 Compensation for less 
favored areas (115 ha) Euro/ha 
Total 
premium 
Decrease of average cost/delivered ton 
milk 
Denmark 0,00             -                   -       
Germany 0,00             -                   -       
Sweden 157-->79 16 105        7,66     
Source: (Own arrangement)  
 
8.6 Diesel  
The diesel consumption at the farm is calculated by synchronizing the values from the IFCN 
farm and farm plan with data from Agriwise. The estimated consumption of diesel at the farm 
amounts to 23 400 litres. The diesel consumption from the IFCN farm was somewhat higher 
than the data from Agriwise. The refund for diesel costs with the Danish system is 0,327 Euro 
per litre making the total tax 0,063 Euro per litre. When applying the German system the total 
tax amounts to 0,256 Euro per litre making the total cost 5998 Euros in tax. In Sweden the 
refund is 0,249 Euro per litre which makes the total tax 0,232 Euro per litre diesel, see Table 
42. As the diesel reduction is a variable reduction the refund can be related equation (26) and 
equation (30). 
 
The Danish rules provide the highest tax reduction for diesel fuel. Denmark has the lowest 
initial tax rate making the tax after reduction 0,063 Euro per litre. What is noteworthy is that 
the Danish tax after reduction is significantly lower than in both Sweden and Germany. 
Sweden is the country with the second highest reduction. Initially Sweden has the highest tax 
but after the reduction the second highest. Germany has initially the second highest tax rate 
but the lowest reduction making the tax after reduction the highest of all three countries.  
 
Since the diesel tax is a variable input the reduction of diesel fuel also becomes variable 
depending on the use. A calculation reveal that the Danish tax reduction increase the average 
cost for milk with 0,70 Euro per ton delivered milk for the case farm. Given the Swedish 
system, the average cost increase with 2,59 Euro per ton of delivered milk. When applying the 
German system, which has the lowest reduction, the average cost increase with 2,85 Euro per 
ton.  
 
72 
 
Table 42 Total tax for diesel consumption, estimated use at farm is 23 400 litre 
Total tax on  
diesel at the farm  
Tax after reduction 
(Euro / Litre) Total Cost 
Increase in average 
cost/delivered ton milk 
Denmark 0,063 1 470 0,70 
Germany 0,256 5 998 2,85 
Sweden  0,232 5 451 2,59 
 Source: (Own arrangement)  
 
8.7 Electricity 
The estimated electricity consumption at the farm is 265 210 kWh. The refund provided by 
the different systems reveal a broad variety. The Danish system yields a tax reduction of 
0,081 Euro per kWh with a total tax of 0,00981 Euro per kWh. The Swedish system yields a 
reduction of 0,0289 Euro per kWh with a total tax of 0,00052 Euro. Germany is characterized 
by the lowest reduction of the three countries with 0,0051 Euro per kWh. The German system 
has the highest total cost which amount to 0,01537 Euro per kWh and a total cost of 4 076  
Euro. The refund for electricity can be related to equation (26) and equation (30). 
 
Initially, the tax on electricity is the lowest in Germany but due to the lowest reduction the 
German farmers are charged with the highest tax rate, see Table 43. Initially the tax rate in 
Denmark is substantially higher tax rate than both Sweden and Germany. The rate is 4,4 times 
higher than the German tax rate but due to the reduction the tax is the second highest. Sweden 
with the second highest reduction is left with a substantially lower tax after the reduction 
which is close to zero.  
 
The refund from electricity tax is important for dairy production which consumes a lot of 
energy. The refunds represent a variable subsidy and affect the marginal as well as average 
cost of dairy production and thereby also the optimal yield per dairy cow, see equation (26) 
and (30). The Danish system with the highest reduction increase the average production cost 
with 1,24 Euro per ton delivered milk. The Swedish system which has the lowest tax 
experience increased costs which amounts to 0,07 Euro per delivered ton milk. Germany with 
the lowest refund has the highest tax which increase the average costs with 1,94 Euro per 
delivered ton milk. 
 
Table 43, Total tax on energy and average cost for milk, estimated consumption at farm is 265 210 kWh 
Total tax on  
electricity at the farm  
Tax after reduction 
(Euro / kWh) Total Cost 
Increase in average 
cost/delivered ton milk 
Denmark 0,00981 2 601 1,24 
Germany 0,01537 4 076 1,94 
Sweden  0,00052 139 0,07 
 Source: (Own arrangement)  
 
8.8 Land Tax 
The land tax in Denmark is calculated based on the market value of land. The case farm does 
not own all land. The farm rents 40 per cent of the arable land and 40 per cent of the pasture 
land. The land tax is only charged on the land owned and not for the land which is rented, but 
it may affect the rent. The market value for tillable land is 14 335 Euro per hectare and for 
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pastureland the market value amounts to 3 144 Euro per hectare. The taxable value is 80 per 
cent of the market value with a total taxable value about 1 077 000 Euro, see Table 44.  
 
The tax in Denmark varies depending on the municipality. However, the maximum tax for 
2010 with the reductions for the agricultural sector is 1,23 per cent and a minimum tax of 0,63 
per cent. The municipality with the lowest tax has a base rate of 1,6 per cent and the 
municipality with the highest tax has a base rate of 3,4 per cent. The value used for the case 
farm is determined by the average of the highest and lowest tax rates and amounts to 2 per 
cent. Given the applicable reductions for agricultural of 0,97 per cent, the land tax amounts to 
1,03 per cent of the taxable value. The total land tax for the case farm with the Danish tax is 
thereby 11 097 Euro.  
 
Table 44, Land tax for the case farm with the Danish system 
 Measure Euro 
Owned land 
(hectare) 
Arable market value/hectare 14 335 90 
Pasture market value/hectare 3 144 18 
Total market value of land 1 346 746   
Taxable value 1 077 397   
Total Tax 1,03 % 11 097   
Source: (Own arrangement)  
 
The land tax in Germany has remained the same for a long period of time and therefore the 
average payment of 12 Euro per hectare is applicable to the farm. The total cost for land tax is 
then 1296 Euro per year. There is no tax on land in Sweden. The land tax is considered a 
fixed cost and can therefore be related to equation (14). 
 
When a comparison of the land tax is conducted between the three countries it is clear that the 
tax affect the Danish farmers the most. The tax is not solely related to dairy production but 
agriculture as a whole. However, for an existing dairy producer the tax represent a cost. Given 
Danish rules the tax increases the cost of production with 5,28 Euro per ton of delivered milk. 
For Germany the tax increase the cost of production with 0,62 Euro per ton of delivered milk. 
Since there is no land tax in Sweden production costs are not affected, see Table 45 
 
Table 45, Increase of average cost for milk due to land tax 
Country 
Total tax in 
Euro 
Increase in average  
cost/delivered ton milk 
Denmark 11 097 5,28 
Germany 1 296 0,62 
Sweden 0 0 
Source: (Own arrangement)  
 
8.9 Fertilizer 
Denmark is the only country which still has a tax on fertilizer. The tax in Denmark is 0,67 
Euro per kilo of pure nitrogen. The case farm has access to manure which therefore reduces 
the need for additional fertilizer. The use of additional nitrogen is estimated to approximately 
25 000 kilo. When applying the Danish system costs increase with 16 750 Euro. The increase 
in the cost of fertilizer affects the average cost negatively which increases with 7,96 Euro per 
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ton of delivered milk. However, as mentioned in section 5.7.1 farms can be excluded from the 
tax if a fertilizer account is registered at “Plantedirektoratet” and apply for exemption for 
fertilizer tax. If a farm receives the exemption the Danish system is the same as in Germany 
and Sweden which do not tax fertilizer.  
 
8.10 Emergency aid 
All three systems received emergency aid from EU which was given to the dairy producers. 
The basis for the payment varies which also results in different levels of payments among the 
countries. The most profitable system is the Swedish system which is based on the delivered 
amount of milk during a reference period. This payment decreases the average cost per 
delivered ton milk with 2,35 Euros, see Table 46. The German system which is based on 
grassland results in the lowest payment among the emergency aid packages from EU. 
However, in addition to the emergency aid from EU Germany has two national payments 
which in total makes the German system the most favourable with a decrease in average cost 
which amount to 3,71 Euros per delivered ton milk. The Danish system results in the lowest 
payments for the case farm with a decrease in average cost which only amounts to 2,10 Euros 
per delivered ton milk.  
 
Table 46, Total value of the emergency aid, both EU and national subsidies included 
Country Emergency aid 
Decrease in average cost / 
delivered ton milk 
Denmark 4 422 2,10 
Germany 7 810 3,71 
Sweden 4 942 2,35 
Source: (Own arrangement)  
 
8.11 Cost for labour 
The cost for labour in the three countries varies not only on due to different levels of taxation 
but also due to salary levels. In order to illustrate the differences in costs for labour for the 
case farm the wage payment in Sweden is set as a standard. From the IFCN data describing 
the cost of salary for an employee per year a net income was calculated by detracting all 
Swedish income taxes. The cost of having an employee at the case farm with an annual net 
income of 16 784 Euros is the highest in Germany where the total cost is 31 489 Euros, see 
Table 47. In Sweden is the annual cost for an employee 30 074 Euros which is the second 
most expensive. Denmark has the lowest cost per employee with an annual cost of 26 438 
Euros. The cost for labour is a can be related to equation (26) and equation 30. 
 
Germany compared to Sweden faces an increase in average cost per delivered ton milk of 
2,82 Euros per ton. Denmark with the lowest cost receives a decrease in average cost with 
7,26 Euros per delivered ton milk.  
 
Although Denmark has the highest overall tax pressure in the EU the cost for labour is the 
lowest of the three countries. This is an effect of rather low social security fees which are paid 
by the employer. Germany which has the lowest overall tax pressure of the three countries has 
rather high social security fees. The fees in Germany amount to 39,1 per cent while the 
payment in Denmark is 8 per cent. Sweden’s payments for social security amount to 31,42 per 
cent.  
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Table 47 Cost for having a full time employee with the same annual net income in the three countries, the 
average cost is calculated using 4,2 employees 
 Measure 
Net Income 
per employee 
Cost per 
employee 
Difference per 
employee 
Increase in average cost / 
delivered ton milk 
Denmark 16 784 26 438 -3 636 -7,26 
Germany  16 784 31 489 1 415 2,82 
Sweden 16 784 30 074 0 0 
Source: (Own arrangement)  
 
8.12 Summarizing analysis 
The summarizing result of each individual component is calculated in Table 48. The 
aggregated results in Table 49 show that the German system when applied to the case farm 
faces the most decrease in the average cost. However, when the Danish system is applied and 
the farm has been exempt from fertilizer tax this system produces an even larger decrease in 
average cost per delivered ton milk which amounts to 58,61 Euro per delivered ton milk. The 
Swedish system affects the cost the least but Sweden is also the country with the lowest 
payments within SPS. However, the Swedish system provides the highest environmental 
payments which also results in the cheapest feed for the dairy cows. The land tax in the 
Danish system has a large negative influence on the cost. The Danish system affects the case 
farm with a lower tax on diesel as well as a much lower cost for labour. The tax on electricity 
is close to nothing in Sweden while the cost in Germany amounts to 1,94 Euro per delivered 
ton milk.  
 
Table 48, Summarizing effect of subsidies and taxes, decrease of average cost / delivered ton milk 
 Measure 
SPS after 
modulation 
8% 
Agri-
environmental 
measures 
Tax on 
diesel 
Tax on 
electricity Land tax 
Fertilizer 
tax 
Emergency 
aid Labour 
Denmark 53,33 3,13 -0,70 -1,24 - 5,28 - 7,96 2,10 7,26 
Germany 53,88 8,71 -2,85 -1,94 - 0,62 - 3,71 - 2,83 
Sweden 40,87 14,48 -2,59 -0,07 - - 2,35 - 
Source: (Own arrangement)  
 
Table 49, Aggregated effect from subsidies and tax reductions on the case farm with the three systems without 
fertilizer tax 
 Measure 
Total Decrease of average cost / 
delivered ton milk 
 Denmark 58,61 
 Germany 58,06 
 Sweden 55,04 
 Source: (Own arrangement)  
 
The total income for the case farms calculated according to equation (31) with the different 
systems is presented in Table 50. The case when the Germany system is applied yields the 
highest net farm income of 277 940 Euro. The German system corresponds to an average cost 
of 256,3 per delivered ton milk. The German system faces the highest average cost among the 
three systems but a higher income making the production the second most profitable. The 
Danish system without the fertilizer tax yields the lowest average cost per delivered ton milk 
which amount to 248,6 Euro per delivered ton milk and generates a net farm income of 
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272 870. An example of the farm income statement is available in appendix 5. The Swedish 
system applied to the case farm results in the lowest net farm income of 271 542 Euros. 
However, the Swedish system produces the second lowest average cost of 521,3 Euros per 
delivered ton milk but the larger costs making it the least profitable. 
 
Table 50 Economic result for the case farm with the three different systems  
  Denmark Germany Sweden 
Total Income 925 178 946 496 929 335 
Total Operational Costs 522 845 538 940 528 476 
Gross Margin 402 332 407 557 400 859 
Net Farm income 272 870 277 940 271 542 
        
Average cost / delivered ton 
milk 248,6 256,3 251,3 
Gross margin / delivered ton 
milk 191,3 193,8 190,6 
Source: (Own arrangement)  
 
8.13 Discussion 
The European countries strive according to Article 2 of the Rome treaty 1957 to establish a 
common market within the EU. Issues like stability and harmonization is often mentioned in 
discussions concerning the common agricultural policies, CAP. Agricultural policy is an area 
which has a lot of supranational features. All the interventions should reasonably well reduce 
differences in competitiveness between EU members. But the European system regulating 
agriculture is complex and difficult to overview. The subsidy system is changing from 
production related subsidies to an increased focus on rural development and environmental 
care. This change is balancing to not risk the situation of the farmers.  
 
Denmark, Germany and Sweden are closely related markets both politically and 
geographically. All are northern European counties and has relatively similar conditions 
compared to each other. Germany and Sweden contains various nature and climate while 
Denmark is more homogenous and dominated by agricultural land. By choosing to compare 
regions of Schleswig-Holstein and southern Sweden within these countries which are similar 
to the conditions in Denmark makes it possible to reduce this effect. Differences in 
competitiveness related to disparities in climate and soil condition will be reduced as much as 
possible. The case farm is when the Swedish system is applied receiving compensation, LFA, 
to reduce the affect of less beneficial conditions. It is common that Swedish dairy farms 
receive these payments. To study a Swedish farm which does not receive this type of payment 
should not be relevant, because they represent a minority of the Swedish dairy farms.  
 
Comparing farm structure show that the average farm size differs a lot between the countries 
with the average Danish farmer keeps 127 dairy cows the German 44,7 cows. Looking at 
Schleswig-Holstein are the differences smaller, the average farm has 68, 6 cows. The 
structural change from smaller to bigger farms is a ongoing development in all three 
countries. Dairy industries merge into larger units across the borders making farmers in 
Sweden, Denmark and Germany selling milk to the same buyer. The heterogeneity among the 
German dairy producers causes difficulties when comparing to other countries. The dairy 
production in Germany is moving to the southwest parts of the country due to high share 
77 
 
permanent grassland and less beneficial conditions for growing grains. This gives a lover cost 
of silage and leads to a competitive advantage. The increasing dairy production in the 
Northwest Germany is interesting from a Danish and Swedish point of view though its 
geographically close to their markets.  
 
Dairy products are transported across the borders between the three counties in a larger extent 
each year. This makes a comparison of the conditions for production to an important issue. 
When the farmers of the three countries sell their products at the same market will the one 
with the lowest marginal costs get highest profit. This is the discussed by Porter (1985). If the 
farmer cannot achieve a cost advantage is the other possibility to diversify. The dairy market 
including the three countries shows both phenomena. But due to the fact that most farmers are 
selling their milk with the same payment within the three countries eliminates the possibility 
for them to differentiate. This study is comparing the competitiveness by assuming same 
product prices. Under these conditions are the average costs of the farm the measures that 
determine the competitiveness. However, this way of comparing competitiveness between 
countries is questioned by Krugman (1994).  
 
The decoupling of subsidies in the three countries was initiated in 1999 due to the Agenda 
2000 reform. The fact that the system still contains some parts of the former politics leave 
differences between regions that refer to higher or lower grain yields. When livestock 
premiums went through the decoupling process in 2005 the premiums were handled 
differently by the countries. Germany chose to transfer payments from slaughter and 
extensification premiums to the permanent grassland and by doing so distribute all payments 
equally between all farmers in the region. By specifying that the payments should relate to the 
grassland is it somehow anyway likely that farmers will keep animals to ensure that they 
comply with the rules to achieve the payments. Denmark and Germany strives towards a 
similar goal which is to level off differences ending up in a regional system where the pasture 
and arable land attain two separate values.  
 
The agri-environmental payments cause most difficulties when the comparison is made in this 
study. There are subsidies aiming to reduce nitrogen leaching by similar methods in Germany 
and Sweden, while Denmark has a legislative use making it compulsory. Subsides which 
encourage farmers to grow forage and use extensive methods are causing interesting effects at 
the internal feed prices within the farm plan. The fact that the model used in this study is 
relatively fixed, delimits the possibilities to investigate how national differences in crop 
rotation affects the price of feed.  
 
As mentioned by van der Veen (2007) and OECD (2010) there are great difficulties when 
comparing different systems with each other. There are always aspects which are difficult to 
fully cover and when comparing them differences will occur.  
 
In addition to the tax and subsidy systems which in the beginning were labled as “direct 
monetary values” the “indirect monetary values” plays an important role when comparing 
competitiveness. Rules for animal welfare well as the rules for environment vary between the 
countries and both of these have a large impact on the competitiveness. The rules concerning 
animal welfare affect the farmers with different costs for buildings as well production. One 
way of comparing the rules regarding animal welfare is by comparing costs for constructing 
barns. With increased animal welfare the costs for constructing barns tend to increase and can 
therefore be measured as cost for capital.   
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9. Conclusions 
 
The aim of this study has been to indentify how policies affect the competitiveness between 
Denmark, Germany and Sweden. The study also consists of two objectives.  
 
What are the implications for competitiveness between Danish, German and 
Swedish subsidies? 
 
What are the implications for competitiveness between the Danish, German and 
Swedish taxation systems? 
 
The effects from the three different systems show a wide range of implications for the case 
farm. Denmark has the largest positive effect from the political system with a decrease in 
average costs by 58,61 Euro per ton of delivered milk for the case farm. Germany has the 
second highest effect with a decrease in average costs by 58,06 Euro per delivered ton milk. 
However, if the Danish farm has no exemption from the fertilizer tax the Danish system has 
the lowest effect on the case farm with a decrease in average cost of 50,65 Euro per ton 
delivered milk. The Swedish system experiences the lowest impact on the costs. The decrease 
in average cost amounts to 55,04 Euro per delivered ton. The Swedish system provides the 
lowest SPS among the three countries but the highest payment for environmental measures.  
 
The tax system in Denmark is considered most favorable as is has the most positive effect on 
the average production cost per delivered ton milk. Denmark has the lowest tax on diesel after 
the reduction but a substantially higher cost for land tax. However, the lower cost for labour 
compensates for the high land tax and makes the system most favorable for the case farm. The 
Swedish system with a very low tax on electricity and a similar tax on diesel as Germany is 
considered the second most favorable system. The German system has the largest negative 
affect the production cost and is therefore considered the least favorable for the case farm. 
The German system has the highest taxes after the reductions on diesel and electricity as well 
as increased cost for labour and land tax.  
 
Overall the analysis shows that the Danish system on the case farm results in the lowest 
average cost which amount to 248,6 Euros and therefore it is to be considered the most 
competitive system. The German system has the highest average cost which amount to 256,3 
Euros and should therefore be the least competitive. However, the German system results in 
higher income which make the system the most profitable. This differs from the assumptions 
by Porter (1985) which is that the lowest marginal cost would be considered the most 
competitive. The Swedish system gives the second lowest average cost which amount to 
251,3 Euros and would be the second most competitive system. But due to the fact that the 
Swedish system generates the lowest gross margin makes it the least profitable and least 
competitive.  
 
There are substantial difficulties in comparing different systems with each other. Although all 
three countries act on the same market the differences in specific areas are quite large due to 
the political systems. The differences in the political systems also result in differences in the 
economic conditions for the dairy farmers However, overall when comparing the three 
systems the result reveals that the differences between the systems are fairly small. The study 
which compares several rules still does not cover the full implications from the political 
systems. Differences in the political system affect the market prices within a country, for 
example a subsidy. Having higher subsidies on land increases profitability and therefore also 
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the market price of land, thereby increasing capital costs compared to a country with a lower 
subsidy. Market prices tend to adjust to the conditions within a country and therefore the 
differences in the political systems can be leveled to some extent. 
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Appendix 1 
Exchange rates 
 
When recalculating currencies the following exchange rates have been used. The currencies 
are the annual average for each currency except from 2011 which is the average between 
January-April.  
 
2006 1 EUR = 7,459 DKK 1 EUR = 9,254 SEK 
2007 1 EUR = 7,450 DKK 1 EUR = 9,253 SEK 
2008 1 EUR = 7,456 DKK 1 EUR = 9,614 SEK 
2009 1 EUR = 7,446 DKK 1 EUR = 10,620 SEK 
2010 1 EUR = 7,447 DKK 1 EUR = 9,543 SEK 
2011 1 EUR = 7,455 DKK 1 EUR = 8,892 SEK 
(www, ECB, 2011) 
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Appendix 2 
The feed consumption of the dairy cow and heifer at the case farm is calculated with 
Agriwise.  
Feed Consumption for dairy cows and heifers 
Dairy cows (220) Per head Total 
   Grass silage 1996 439 120 
Corn silage 1673 368 060 
Barley silage 0 0 
Pasturage 0 0 
Grain 561 123 420 
Concentrate purchased 1 636 139 920 
Concentrate purchased 2 1070 235 400 
Minerals 40 8800 
Salt 0 0 
Bedding 185 40 700 
Straw 155 34 100 
Heifers (81,4)   
 Grass silage 1602 130 403 
Corn silage 0 0 
Barley silage 1602 130 403 
Grain 0 0 
Pasturage 1690 137 566 
Minerals 0 0 
Straw 200 16 280 
 
  
90 
 
Appendix 3  
Income statement for the case farm when the Danish system is applied without fertilizer tax. 
  Income Statement   
Income     
3081 Environmental subsidies        6 579,69 €  
3110 Milk Production    738 086,14 €  
3121 Calfs      17 407,73 €  
3133 Dairy cows slaughter      50 940,99 €  
3981 Single Payment Scheme    112 162,00 €  
                     -   €  
Total income    925 176,56 €  
    
                         -   
€  
Costs   
                         -   
€  
4010 Seeds        6 348,57 €  
4011 Seeds cereals        1 483,01 €  
4012 Ley Seeds        1 943,86 €  
4021 N      25 599,70 €  
4024 P        2 463,06 €  
4025 K        1 294,04 €  
4041 Herbicides        2 746,31 €  
4042 Fungicides           431,31 €  
4043 Pesticides           160,79 €  
4062 Sowing        1 929,46 €  
4067 Grassland harvest        5 624,86 €  
4069 Hired labor      20 251,49 €  
4071 Torkning        1 885,44 €  
4075 Analysis fees             41,62 €  
4082 Feed preservatives       19 679,55 €  
4083 Baler twine, nets and plastics           653,43 €  
4130 Kraftfoder mjölkproduktion -            8,28 €  
4132 High yielding feed       77 701,98 €  
4133 Coarse grains purchased       18 545,98 €  
4134 Calf feed        9 305,41 €  
4138 Mineral feed        9 779,26 €  
4157 Bedding        1 407,42 €  
4170 Overheads dairy production      32 374,56 €  
4173 Vet and medicine      21 123,97 €  
4174 Production consulting         1 729,02 €  
4180 Other costs bovine       19 779,94 €  
5110 Arrende/tomträttsavgäld      20 224,25 €  
5170 Repair/maintainence of property      15 718,33 €  
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5191 Land Tax      11 097,14 €  
5310 Electricity for operation      17 861,05 €  
5360 Fuel & oils       12 864,30 €  
5520 Repair/maintenance of inventory      20 957,77 €  
5570 Repair/maintenance land        2 116,73 €  
6100 Office supplies and printing      10 478,89 €  
6210 Communication        3 171,96 €  
6310 Company insurance        6 343,92 €  
6312 Animal insurance         3 020,01 €  
6900 Other external costs        3 667,61 €  
7010 Salaries    111 039,23 €  
Total costs      522 836,93 €  
                     -   €  
Profit before depreciation    402 339,63 €  
                     -   €  
Depreciation                   -   €  
7821 Depreciation Buildings      64 424,19 €  
7832 Depreciation  machines/inventory      23 132,14 €  
                     -   €  
Total depreciation       87 556,32 €  
                     -   €  
Profit after depreciation    314 783,30 €  
                     -   €  
Financial income and expenses                  -   €  
8410 Interest expences       41 913,76 €  
                     -   €  
Total financial income and expenses -   41 913,76 €  
                     -   €  
Net farm income    272 869,54 €  
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Appendix 4 
Value of payments Contractual nature conservation in Germany. 
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Appendix 5 
 
Map over Sweden illustrating the Less Favored Area regions. The case farm is located in 
region 5:a. 
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Appendix 6 
 
The classification system by OECD  
 
Producer Support Estimate (PSE) 
 
A. Support based on commodity outputs  
A1. Market price support (MPS) 
A2. Payments based on output 
 
B. Payments based on input use 
B1. Variable input use 
B2. Fixed capital formation 
B3. On-farm services 
 
C. Payments based on current Area/ Animal numbers/ Receipts/ Income, production required  
C1. Based on current receipts/income 
C2. Based on current area/animal numbers 
 
D. Payments based on non-current Area/Animal numbers/ Receipts/Income, production 
required 
 
E. Payments based on non-current Area/Animal numbers/Receipts/Income, production not 
required 
E1. Variable rates 
E2. Fixed rates 
 
F. Payments based on non-commodity criteria 
F1. Long-term resource retirement 
F2. Specific non-commodity output 
F3. Other non-commodity criteria 
 
G. Miscellaneous payments 
 
General Services Support Estimate (GSSE)  
 
H. Research and development 
I. Agricultural schools 
J. Inspection services 
K. Infrastructure 
L. Marketing and promotion 
M. Public stockholding 
N. Miscellaneous 
 
Consumer Support Estimate (CSE) 
 
Price transfers, the inverse value of Market price support, see A. strives to be adjusted to 
apply to quantities consumed.  
 
Budgetary transfers 
